








EUI Working Paper SPS No. 95/6
Electoral Competition: 
Analytical Dimensions and 
Empirical Problems
- Stefano B artolini
• \





















































































































































































EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, FLORENCE 
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
EUI Working Paper SPS No. 95/6
Electoral Competition: 

































































































No part of this paper may be reproduced in any form 
without permission of the author.
© Stefano Bartolini 
Printed in Italy in September 1995 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana 




























































































The term 'electoral' or 'party competition' is 
utilised either as a loose term for the entire cycle 
of electoral, parliamentary and governmental politics, 
or in the context of the formal modelling of party 
strategies and voting choices within the narrow limits 
of assumptions about actors' motives, preferences, and 
information, or in descriptive accounts of particular 
election campaigns, party platforms and statements, 
etc. The use of the term 'competition' in titles of 
papers, the discussion of the concept itself and its 
measurement have grown in political science literature 
since W.W.II. Still the concept remains vague and 
ambiguous. Its exact theoretical meaning and the kind 
of empirical phenomena that are indicated by it are 
unclear for two reasons.
Firstly, too much is borrowed from the economic theory 
of competition. The assumed fundamental analogy, 
similarity or resemblance between economic and 
political competition is erroneous. Competition in 
politics is altered by the degree of collusion that is 
inherent in the achievement of the exclusive good of 




























































































of degree. Secondly, like economists, political 
scientists, tend to view competition as a uni­
dimensional phenomenon; as a single property of which 
there can be more or less and whose upper limit is a 
model of 'perfect' competition. On the contrary 
however, the conditions of competition in politics are 
manifold. Moreover, they neither covary, nor do their 
maximisation point or reach 'perfection'.
This paper argues these points taking the lead from 
the unintended 'social value' which is the by-product 
of competition in politics. This value is taken as the 
yardstick for discussing the conditions that need to 
be met in order for competition to produce it. The 
paper analyses these conditions, claiming that their 
parallel maximisation is impossible. The debate about 
political competition must concern the different 
dimensions and conditions of competition a society 
wants to maximise in specific historical situations.
The unintended 'social value' of competition
From the early, almost implicit, appraisal of the 




























































































competition has achieved a generalised and explicit 
recognition as an adequate and valuable technique for 
the satisfaction of almost any need and the attainment 
of almost any value in almost any sphere of human 
activity. The exceptional value attributed to the 
parallel efforts by several parties to obtain the same 
prize is surprising when one considers the number of 
fields in which the principle of subordination of 
individual efforts to the collective goal is still 
prevalent and legitimised: both private and public 
bureaucracies, productive processes, family circles 
and kinship groups. Yet, the 'ideological' trend 
nowadays prizes competition as the default and 
prevalent mode. Other principles or techniques of 
individual forces co-ordination need ad hoc 
justification and legitimation and are reserved to 
fields where competition is regarded as unattainable 
or not yet attainable. Whether the satisfaction of 
human needs and desires and the creation of values is 
to be left to the competition of individual forces or 
to their co-ordination in view of a collectively 




























































































The social legitimacy of competition rests on a point: 
the net result of competition among individuals for 
the same prize produce an overall result which is 
advantageous to a 'third part'. The third gaining part 
can be identified in individualistic premises as well 
as in functionalist or systemic ones. In the first 
perspective, the third gaining part is a collective 
welfare function maximising each individual function. 
In the second perspective the advantage is the 
realisation of some overall value which is positive 
from the systemic point of view. Georg Simmel has 
analysed the sociological mechanism of this 
transformation of individual impulses into socially 
valuable results1 . From the formal point of view 
competition rests on an individualistic principle; the 
refusal of the subordination of every individual 
interest and effort to a uniform supra-individual (or 
group) interest. Competition assumes that each 
competitor pursues his/her interest, utilising his/her 
energies according to such interest, and evaluates the 
results in terms of objective accomplishments. In the 
form of 'pure' competition, unlike other forms of 




























































































not in the hands of either adversary. In 'pure' 
competition 'each competitor by himself aims at the 
goal, without using its strength on the adversary... 
from a superficial standpoint, it proceeds as if there 
existed no adversary, but only the aim' 2 .
Competition presupposes, therefore, the existence of a 
common aim, of an objective value desired by all 
competing parties; be it profit, glory, scientific 
prestige or power. However, the social legitimation 
element of competition is that the subjective 
antagonistic efforts that lead to the realisation of 
the objective value desired by the competitors, 
determine as a by-product the realisation of other 
values outside it. The final result of those 
antagonistic efforts transform them into an ultimate 
goal , while from the point of view of the individual 
competitor, this ultimate goal is neither wanted nor
aimed at. In this mechanism lies the value of
competition for the social circle of which the
competitors are members. 'From the standpoint of the 
society [competition] offers subjective motives as the 




























































































the standpoint of the competing parties, it uses the 
production of objective values as means for attaining 
subjective satisfaction' 3 . Thus, competition is 
legitimised from the collective point of view through 
its capacity to overcome, and indeed deny, the tension 
between subjective and collective goals.The latter are 
satisfied by the objective results of competition as 
opposed to the subjective goals of competitors.
Although resting on the individualistic principle of 
non subordination of subjective goals, competition 
finds its legitimation in the fulfilment of socially 
desirable ends. The latter justifies the losses 
incurred by individuals in the process. In this sense, 
individualistic competition should not be seen as 
opposed to the exclusivity or predominance of the 
'social interest', but rather to other 'techniques' 
for the attainment of the same social interest. The 
relationship between competition and individualism is 
not complete without the legitimising reference to the 
social interest. The legitimation of individualistic 




























































































of competing 'techniques' for the co-ordination of 
individual efforts to achieve collective goals 4 .
Schumpeter, Downs and the 'social value' of political 
competition
This conception of the valuable by-product of 
competition has been extended to politics relatively 
later than in other fields. The objective value prized 
by antagonistic individuals and groups in the
political sphere is usually identified with political 
power 5 . The socially valuable by-product of this 
antagonistic struggle for power is, however, less 
clearly defined.
A short answer is that competition produces as by­
product democracy. The answer is inadequate.
Competition presupposes the existence of sets of 
norms and rules which offer at least a minimal 
regulatory framework without which it can well 
degenerate into utter unregulated conflict. Democracy 
as a set of basic rights and of respected procedures 
is a necessary condition for political and electoral 




























































































round. Pluralism, which is a necessary condition of 
democracy, need not be 'competitive'. Other principles 
may and do regulate the interaction among a plurality 
of actors. Whether politico-electoral competition has 
a feedback effect in maintaining, defending, 
stabilising or otherwise improving the basic 
constitutional capsule of democracy and/or its 
pluralism is another matter, but it does not change 
the logical priority of the latter with respect to the 
former.
With their influential works Schumpeter and Downs6 
are the forerunners of the 'third gaining part axiom' 
of competition in the political realm. Their work is 
well known and there is no need to recast it here 
except for a few points and general implications of 
their approach. Schumpeter's innovation is to render 
irrelevant all motivations of political elites with 
the exception of their shared appetite for power. Once 
channelled within a 'social capsule' 7 of norms and 
procedures defining appropriate and acceptable means, 
these appetites tend to produce social values which 




























































































entire society. There is no need to assume that those 
social values are consciously aimed at by parties in 
the competitive struggle. This notion presented 
several advantages. It saved the normative character 
of democracy by attributing to voters the role of 
ultimate instance of selection of their rulers. At the 
descriptive level, it enabled the renunciation of the 
unrealistic degree of political competence, 
initiative and altruism required by other theories of 
democracy that Schumpeter labelled 'classic'. It 
facilitated the unambigous distinction between 
democratic and non democratic systems, through the 
exclusivity of the popular sanction of government by 
elections. Finally, it helped to rephrase the dilemma 
of 'classic theories' concerning the democracy- 
authority relationship . It avoided that the 
Leviathan, once legitimised by a social contract, be 
free to operate for the common good.
Schumpeter makes aclose link between competition and 
democracy. His definition of democracy is 'government 
approved by people' and the democratic system is 




























































































a free, fair and loyal electoral competition. The
democratic method is only 'the institutional
instrument to arrive at political decisions on the 
bases of which single individuals obtain the power to 
decide through a competition which has as object the 
popular vote' 8 . The procedures which constitute
democracy are the constitutional aspect of politico- 
electoral competition; the social capsule of
competition. Actually, his theory is more a theory of 
democracy than one of competition. His procedural 
definition makes competition essential to democracy; a 
defining characteristic of democracy.
Yet Schumpeter does not say much about competition 
itself. He acknowledges that 'our theory it is of 
course no more definite than it is the concept of 
competition for leadership' 9 . Neither does he 
formally define the socially desirable by-product of 
politico-electoral competition. The by-product seems 
to be the peaceful selection of the ruling elites; 
their submission at fixed intervals to the renewal of 
the mandate; in short, the institutionalisation of 




























































































between the ideal case of perfect competition, which 
does not exist, and the real cases in which any 
electoral contestation of the ruling elite is 
prevented by force, a whole series of variations 
exists . Within this range, the democratic method of 
government fades by 'imperceptible steps' into the 
authoritarian method 10 . However, he does not specify 
what makes for this variation. Competition, therefore, 
is essentially conceived as electoral 
'contestability1, that is, as openness of the 
electoral race to challengers. Schumpeter's explicit 
affirmation concerning the unintended (by the actors)
1 social value' of politico-electoral competition stops 
here: the repeated selection process of the leadership 
and to its approval by the people.
Downs pushes further Schumpeter's thesis and builds on 
it explicitly recognising the inspiration 11 . 
Competition ' is a mechanism whereby political parties
which are engaged in what Schumpeter called a
'competitive struggle for the people's vote ' are
obliged to take account of the preference of the




























































































The unintended social value of competition is
t
'responsiveness'. One does not need to assume that 
candidates and parties want to respond to voters' 
preferences. They are involuntarily forced to do so 
while pursuing their goals of power by maximising the 
necessary vote. Competition obliges elites to take 
into account the preferences of voters. The thesis is 
about how competition compel the transformation of 
each party's motives into the social value of each 
party's honesty, responsibility and responsiveness to 
electors' desires 13 .
This difference between Schumpeter and Downs is not a 
minor one. Downs' model reaches this conclusion on the 
basis of well known assumptions. His voter is a 
rational actor whose choice depends on the comparative 
evaluation of the advantages he/she expects from the 
governmental performance of different parties. He/she 
will offer his/her vote to the party which proposes 
that set of public policies which comparatively offers 
the highest return in terms of well-being as
subjectively evaluated by the voter. Similarly, the 




























































































policies which they perceive will maximise their 
votes. In the pages where Schumpeter develops his 
concept of competitive struggle for votes, references 
to responsiveness are absent. Schumpeter does not say 
that voters know what they want and are able to 
evaluate what it is done. Consequently, he does not 
dare to conclude that elites will give them what they 
want. The kind of policies that are offered does not 
concern him very much. On the contrary, one can find 
in the text several statements that underline the 
crucial importance of the selection process: ' .. [we]
...make the deciding of issues by the electorate 
secondary to the election of the men who are to do the 
deciding'; 'Its choice [of the voter] does not flow 
from his initiative, but is being turn shaped, and the 
shaping is an essential part of the democratic 
process'; 'Voters confine themselves to accepting this 
bid in preference to others or refusing to accept it'l 
14 . One could probably say that Schumpeter's vision 





























































































With Downs, on the contrary the concept of
'responsiveness' to the voter preferences is the 
essence of the unintended social value of electoral 
competition. Both what it is offered by 
parties/candidates and the actual basis on which the 
voters judge are not only relevant, but essential to 
the achievement of the unintended social result of 
competition. While for Schumpeter ’procedural
democracy', which isauthenticated in fair electoral 
competition, offers goods that are independent from 
the substantive preferences of the voters and the 
substantive offers of the parties, Downsholds that 
through competition, procedural democracy transforms 
itself ipso facto into the only possible substantial 
democracy; a democracy which responds to voter 
preferences. Schumpeter’s goals could be achieved 
even in the face of ' irrational ' , uninformed or even 
foolish or random voting. For Downs, these kind of 
voters do not force elites to involuntarily respond. 
Schumpeter's version of the competitive struggle for 
the vote is even compatible with a strong elitist 
vision whereby voter perceptions and preferences are 




























































































elites. Downs' version is not. Schumpeter emphasises 
the periodic submission of elites to an otherwise 
unspecified voter judgement. Downs stresses the 
capacity of elites to respond readily and 
sympathetically to demands. Thus, government 'approved 
by' the people it is not to the same thing as 
government 'responsive to' the people.
An objection to this emphasis on the different 
unintended social value of competition in Schumpeter 
and Downs is that the latter only brought to the 
logical final consequence a line of reasoning already 
implicit in Schumpeter's premises. However, there is 
sufficient evidence in Capitalism, Socialism and 
Democracy to demonstrate Schumpeter's mistrust of any 
substantive link between what people want and what 
elites offer in the form of a typical dyadic exchange. 
He was simply unwilling to accept the idea.
The conditions of competition
The definition of the unintended social value 
achieved through the 'technique' of individual 




























































































Different 'social values' imply different conditions 
of attainment. if the value is the periodic 
accountability of governing elites, this can be 
guaranteed by procedural rules governing the holding 
of periodic elections and the possibility for several 
political actors to contest them. The only necessary 
condition to this end is contestability, that is the 
actual possibility for different political leaders and 
groups to contest free and fair elections.
Unquestionably contestability is a condition of 
competition, but at the same time, contestability is 
also a basic defining characteristic of democracy; the 
one which makes political pluralism possible.
Contestability, therefore, is the point where 
democracy and competition overlap. There are however, 
other often cited conditions of democracy which are 
not necessary conditions of competition 16 . At the 
same time, there are other conditions of competition 
which need not to be regarded as conditions of 
democracy 17 .
In brief, I will argue that there are three other 




























































































responsiveness is the goal aimed at. They can be 
identified working backward from responsiveness 
What is the key to responsiveness in competitive 
races? Excluding as irrelevant individual motivations, 
the standard argument is that leaders in striving to 
keep or acquire power and office will be constantly 
worried about how voters are going to react to their 
actions. This worry is necessarily a function of the 
extent to which the leader is him/herself exposed to a 
reasonable threat of electoral sanction. Only if 
he/she will is worried about the reactions of voters 
will he/she be 'constantly piloted by the anticipation 
of those reactions' 18 . Responsiveness is achieved by 
introducing Friedrich's mechanism of anticipated 
reactions 19 . It follows that a key condition of
competition is the electoral vulnerability of
incumbents.
In turn, what are the necessary condition of 
incumbents' vulnerability? The condition is that 
voters are willing to punish and reward; that is, they 
are available to modify their electoral choice. If 




























































































unthinkable. One does not need to postulate full 
elasticity of the vote, but some predisposition to 
electoral switch must be present if vulnerability is 
to be conceivable. The quota that is necessary, that 
is to say, the type and number of voters, is 
impossible to say at this stage. What matters is that 
such electoral availability will change from one 
context to another and in time.Therefore this 
condition will be called electoral availability 20 .
If responsiveness depends on vulnerability, and the 
latter requires voters' availability, what motivates 
the available voter to act for or against the 
incumbent government? This must be the differentiation 
of the offer and the conseuqent perception of 
different potential outcomes. Whatever 
parties/candidates offer (programmes, policies, 
ideologies, images, etc.) it must be different and 
clearly 'spelled out' for the voters, in order to make 
vulnerability not just the chance outcome of random 
change in voting habits. The anticipated reactions of 
both government and opposition parties (which are 




























































































to voters' responses to differentiated and clear 
offers. The latter enable the voter to decide whether 
to change his/her electoral preference, and also make 
intelligible to the elites the reactions of the 
voters. If products are not differentiated (or their 
difference is not perceived), voters can punish or 
reward but no responsiveness will be achieved. I have 
argued that this is not a problem in a Schumpeterian 
perspective, where the approval of rulers is the 
essential aspect and ultimate goal. But it is crucial 
to the Downsian responsiveness perspective. Offers 
must therefore be decidable by voters in order to make 
the entire process intelligible to both voters and 
elites alike. I will call this condition the 
decidability of the offer 21 .
The argument thus far, has been the following. If 1) 
we admit that electoral competition is legitimised by 
a by-product valuable to third-part; if 2) we go 
beyond Shumpeter's minimal goal and accept 
responsiveness as the yardstick of competition 

































































































In the subsequent sections each of these conditions 
will be discussed in more detail.
Contestability
Contestability is a necessary condition of both 
democracy and competition. Conceptually, this overlap 
is ill-starred. It generates a great deal of 
confusion with the result that sometimes competition 
is equated with democracy and vice versa. In one of 
the few articles explicitly devoted to this topic, 
Roberto D 'Alimonte has argued the case for an orderly 
distinction between the two processes insisting that 
'democracy is a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition of competition' and that 'competition is 
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of 
democracy' . The logical corollary is that there can 
be democracy without competition, but not competition 
without democracy. Competition does not derive solely 




























































































competition. D ’Alimonte argues that the condition of 
freedom for parties to present candidates and 
programmes and the condition of freedom for electors 
to chose them 'identify democracy not with 
competition, but with an open politico-electoral 
market in which the freedom of access is guaranteed 
both on the demand side (the electors) and on the 
supply side (the parties)' 22 . Logically therefore, if 
the politico-electoral market is open, it need not 
necessarily be competitive. The conditions of 
democracy are not the conditions of competition.
In other words, D'Alimonte clearly separates 
democracy and competition making contestability a 
property that defines an open electoral market (that 
is democracy), not a competitive market (that is 
competition). However, this line of thinking entails a 
significant drawback. Considering contestability as a 
property of democracy, means that all democracies 
should present this feature. Hence, the possibility of 
regarding different democracies as having dissimlar 
degrees of contestability is curtailed. If democracies 




























































































degree of openness? Primarily, the answer is no. I 
want to keep, within the general concept of 
competition, a dimension which indicates exactly the 
extent of openness to contestation of the electoral 
and political race. There are different political 
systems or circumstances whose democratic nature is 
undeniable, but which offer to new and old claimants 
very different opportunities for electoral 
contestation .
The usual association of condition of free entry with 
the idea of the market, and the frequent use of the 
term 'political' or 'electoral market' is somewhat 
equivocal. If we take seriously the economic 
terminology, the market is defined as an institution 
for the consumption of transactions. A market best 
performs this function when every buyer who is willing 
to pay more than the minimum realised price for any 
class of commodity succeeds in buying the commodity, 
and every seller who is willing to sell at lower price 
than the minimum realised price succeeds in selling 
the commodity . In other words, a market exist when 




























































































good, and those who are willing to charge less find 
the appropriate buyer. A market it is not defined by 
ease of entry, but by the ' obtainability1 of 
transactions. In this sense a political market 
condenses both electoral contestability and electoral 
availability. It is questionable whether this concept 
is of any use in politics. We should we ready to 
profoundly revise our categories. For instance, 
abstentionism becomes the most obvious sign of market 
failure; the existence of voters unable to find the 
desired good. At the same time, an electoral market 
exists when parties offer the same policy package at 
lower prices (taxation?), and when voters intensely 
motivated by a particular policy obtain it by 'paying 
more' (voting twice or what else?).
A further shortcoming in the concept of the 'electoral 
market' when associated with that of the economic 
market, is that market and competition are not only 
different things; they can have little to do with each 
other. A market can perform efficiently as an 
institution for the consumption of transactions and 




























































































other hand, the market can be highly imperfect in its 
performance and competitive at the same time 23 . When 
contestability is analysed in connection with 
political competition, the key operative issue is: 
given certain conditions how many actors do we need or 
can we afford to make competition lively and viable? 
The economic theory of competition in more than a 
century of reflection 24 , has given no definite, 
straighforward answer to the question of how many 
firms are necessary to make a market competitive, and 
of what maximum share of the market control by one 
firm is compatible with competition. The solution 
offered is the definition of the conditions of 
'perfect competition', refined over time . However, to 
say that there must be numerous traders on both sides 
of the market does not identify the minimal number 
necessary to define a competitive market. Moreover, 
the indicators usually utilised to empirically 
evaluate the degree of competition are extraordinarily 
ambiguous. Two examples : concentration ratios are 
used, arguing that the lower the concentration the 
more competitive the market, but again the minimum 




























































































competition is not determined; price homogeneity is 
often regarded as an indicator of competition (the 
more prices are homogeneous the more perfect the 
competition), but the same indicator is often 
considered by Courts as a phenomenon more suggestive 
of collusion than of competition 25 . Indeed the high 
abstraction of the concept of perfect competition and 
its difficult operationalisation have pushed 
economists to look for a more realistic and 'workable' 
concept of competition 26 .
In conclusion, although economists tend to equate 
competition with openness of the market, they do not 
offer a useful solution to the problem of 
contestability in politics. The fact of the matter is 
that the question of entry is far more important in 
politics than in economics. It is somewhat paradoxical 
that economic metaphors are employed to conceptualise 
it. In politics, one can easily define in terms of 
contestability the point where competition ends and it 
is substituted by something else. At the other end of 
the spectrum, we know that a high fragmentation of the 




























































































but rather political chaos. Authority being a public 
good , success in the competition race offers 
authority not just over one's own supporters, but over 
all members of the polity. The indivisible nature of 
authority leads to strong pushes toward oligarchic 
tendencies and determines large economies of scale. 
Competition for private goods allows everyone to deal 
with the preferred partner, even though this partner 
is a very minor one. In politics, there is room for 
only a limited number of parties. New entries are 
immensely more difficult than in business. It is 
difficult to carve out a small niche in politics. 
Besides, small niches may be of very little use. 
Finally oligarchic tendencies and economies of scale 
are also fostered by the protection against foreign or 
international competition which is typical, thus far, 
of political competition.
This can make the comparative empirical study of 
political contestability possible and even easier than 
in economics. Our question should not be what is the 
' perfect' but rather what is the ' viable' level of 




























































































structure of opportunity to contest are institutional 
and linked to variables like the electoral formula, 
the requirements for candidature of individuals and 
lists, the threshold for access to public finance and 
media coverage, the cost of campaigning in different 
circumstances, but also to several other factors not 
strictly institutional. It is therefore better 1) to 
keep contestability as an important dimension of 
competiiton. As will be clear later, the level of 
contestability impinges upon other conditions of 
competiiton; 2) to keep contestability clearly 
separate from electorate availability, thus avoiding 
to condensate both of therm in the ' open market' 
metaphor; 3) to consider contestability as a structure 
of political opportunity; and 4) to concentrate on the 
empirical factors which may impinge upon the 
variations in this structure of opportunities for new 
and old potential claimants.
Availability
In Downs, the rational orientation toward the policies 
or policy packages offered by parties makes the voter 




























































































available to change partisan preference should a 
better offer be made to him 27 . For electoral 
competition it is essential that at least a quota of 
the electorate be available to such change. Such a 
quota represents what is at stake in the rivalry; the 
prize of the parallel efforts by competitors; 
therefore, the incentive for party competition. 
Without available voters, it is unlikely that parties 
would be willing to engage in policy competition.
We do not have precise information about the quota of 
available electorate necessary to make an electoral 
contest competitive or more competitive than another. 
The literature on electoral behaviour has accumulated 
a vast amount of material that indicates the extent to 
which individual voters and electorates are, in fact, 
little inclined to respond to changes of the offer 
with changes in party choice. Strong psychological 
identifications, resulting from organisational 
encapsulation, cultural bonds, and the like make 
important quotas of the national electorates 
unavailable for voting switches. Thus, the actual 




























































































or country is an empirical aspect of crucial 
importance for the study of electoral competition. It 
is probably true that electoral behaviour studies have 
not payed sufficient attention to the topic of 
electoral availability in relation to the issue of the 
competitive nature of elections. We may simply assume 
that, ceteris paribus, the higher the level of 
potential availability, the higher the potential level 
of competition. However, the problem is complicated by 
the fact that the quantity of the available vote may 
be less important than its location.
At this juncture, it is important to underscore that 
the ’available voter' - defined as that voter who is 
willing to consider modifying his/her party choice - 
is not the same as the ' opinion voter ’ , the ' informed 
voter' or, worse, the 'rational voter'. The 'available 
voter' it is not necessarily informed about issues or 
programmes, but is sensitive to them 28 . 
Sensitiveness neither entails strong information, nor 
capacity of judgement; it simply refers to the 
availability to be influenced when choosing, by 




























































































experience. A switcher can be highly uninformed and 
uninterested, as much as a strong identifier or a true 
believer can be politically competent and interested. 
What is certain, however, is that 1) identifiers have 
a lower propensity to switch than sensitive voters; 2) 
voters' sensitivity is higher a) the lower the number 
of cleavage lines activated or mobilised 
(segmentation); b) the less the organisational 
encapsulation of the electorate; c)the more diffuse 
the network of groups and the less interlocking is the 
link between specific political organisations 
(parties) and corporate groups outside the electoral 
domain; 3) parties, if compelled, look for switchers 
irrespective of who they are.
Aggregate measures of electoral volatility (party 
volatility as well as block of parties or system total 
volatility 29 ) are used to characterise the volatility 
of different electorates at different points in time. 
Their importance should not be underestimated, 
notwithstanding their obvious limitations in the 
cancelling out of voting shifts of different signs 




























































































aggregate volatilities are by and large the only thing 
party leaders perceive of the potential electoral 
availability in their system. They are also the only 
certain element which enables them to ascertain the 
electorate's reactions to their strategic choices and 
moves. Individual level volatility has also been 
studied through transition matrices of voting switches 
giving a more precise estimation of the amount of 
electors who actually change their mind from one 
election to the next 30 . Unfortunately, these studies 
are not numerous and this kind of information is not 
collected routinely for elections. Moreover, their 
utilisation for the characterisation of the available 
electorate as the prize of the competitive efforts by 
the parties/candidates, is rare.
A further problem is that, whether aggregated or 
individual, these measures refer to actual voting 
shifts. But electoral availability is poorly measured 
by actual voting shifts. An elector can be 1 at stake' 
in the sense of being available to change her/his 
partisan choice even if in the end he/she will record 




























































































actual voting changes underestimates electoral 
availability, as it records only those available 
electors who actually switched their preference, 
leaving aside those who did not. In the global 
electorate, aggregate volatility underestimates 
individual voting shifts, and the latter underestimate 
the actual electoral availability, as represented in 
Figure 1.





In a recent article, Eijk and Oppenhuis have suggested 
ways to operationalise electoral availability at the 
individual levels which are very promising as they are 




























































































electoral competition. They do not use the term 
availability or available electorate but they pick up 
this dimension with survey data in which people are 
asked about their willingness to vote for parties 
other than the one they prefer 31 . People are ranked 
according to the probability of voting for each of the 
parties in their party system. Voters range from those 
who are likely to vote for only one party to those who 
are likely to vote for several different parties. This 
method allows the differentiation of both different 
electorates and different sections of the same 
electorate, according to their electoral availability 
, although the authors tend to dichotomise their 
result in terms of electors ' beyond' competition and 
electors 1 subject to intense competition' (pp. 60-61). 
Of great interest is their application of the data to 
individual parties. Through a number of operational 
choice, of no concern in this discussion, they compare 
the available vote for a party (those electors who 
declare it to be a possible choice) with the actual 
vote the party eventually gets at the polls. The term 




























































































parties' and it measures the relationship between the 
potential and the actual vote collected by the party.
The merit of this approach is not only that it 
suggests a direction to properly operationalise the 
dimension of electoral availability, but also that it 
relates this aspect to the patterns of electoral 
competition. Eijk and Oppenhuis tend to equate 
electoral availability with electoral competition, 
leaving aside what X consider to be other important 
condition of electoral competition. This is however, a 
minor point. They demonstrate that it is possible not 
only to properly conceptualise, but also to come to 
comparative inter-party and inter-system comparisons 
of electoral availability, seen as a necessary (but 
not sufficient) condition of electoral competition.
Decidability
Given the existence of electoral contestability and 
electoral availabiltiy, what happens if the parties do 
not want to compete? Are there conditions which push 
parties to limit or to avoid altogether the 




























































































versions of the competitive theory of democracy and, 
in particular, formal models of party competition 
refer to the fact that parties offer programmes, 
policies, ideologies, images, issues or whatever else, 
not much is said about the decidability quality of 
these offers necessary to guarantee, improve, maximise 
or otherwise substantiate electoral competition. Is 
the quality of the offer so unimportant for electoral 
competition?
In formal models of voting choice an important role is 
given to what I define here as decidability. The net 
utility of the victory of the voter's preferred 
candidate's in Downs 32 , or the differential benefits 
of outcomes (the party differential), in W. H. Riker 
and P. C. Ordeshook's 'calculus of voting' 33 
indicate how the voter perceives the difference it 
will make for her/him if party or candidate X or Y is 
elected. This obviously depends on product 
differentiation. If products are undifferentiated this 
term is zero and the probability of affecting the 
outcome (which I will discuss in the next section as 




























































































differentials count, but in formal models of 
competition they are reduced to party distances in a 
space either chosen as an example, or postulated or 
drawn from some data set.
For party competition to produce leadership 
responsiveness, the decidability of what is offered to 
voters is a necessary condition. The notion of choice 
is essential. Voters must perceive differences between 
parties/candidates in terms of emphasis, priority or 
performance in order to make a choice. Therefore, 
whatever the party offers, it must be 1) different 
from what others offer and 2) clearly perceived by 
voters. Policy or issue position differentiation among 
parties, visibility and clarity of these differences 
for the voter are what I call here decidability.
There are several reasons why little attention is 
paid to the decidability of the offer in theories of 
competition. Firstly, the decidability of the offer it 
is not regarded as essential, as the emphasis is on 
the competitive selection of political personnel. I 




























































































Schumpeter's position. Secondly, economic analysis 
from which political analogies are drawn, does not 
attribute much importance to this aspect. Quite the 
contrary, in a perfect competition model, goods should 
be as homogeneous as possible. The third and more 
important reason in my opinion, is that somehow the 
decidability of the offer is implicitly - not 
explicitly - postulated. The differentiation of 
products offered is assumed to result from other 
features of the competitive process.
Rational choice theorists consider voter' preferences 
as 'intrinsic', that is, as 'exogenous to the process 
of party competition' 34 . This means that voters have 
preferences which are independent from the offer made 
by politicians and parties. Obviously this is a 
crucial assumption, as one could well imagine that 
voter preferences are shaped to a greater or lesser 
extent by the process of party competition and are in 
no way exogenous to it. Formal theorists, whether or 
not they discuss this issue, come to the conclusion 
that preferences are exogenous 35 . The second 




























































































of political competition is that they are stable 
during the process of competition itself. Combining 
the endogenous versus exogenous shaping of voter’ 
preferences, with their stability or change during the 
process of electoral competition, one can draw the 
following scheme:
See Table 1 at page 86
Clearly, a structure of preferences that is 
endogenously produced throughout the process of 
competition can not be stable and therefore this type 
is impossible 36 . Of the remaining three types that 
normally postulated by economic models of competition 
is Type I. By definition, the structure of preference 
is exogenous, and, in the short run, such a structure 
is also stable. That is, it is not even affacted by 
forces outside the competition process itself.
What form does party competition takes under these 




























































































is acquire information about the stable and 
exogenously determined structure of preferences and 
try to adapt to it. They also need to engage in 
advertising campaigns, trying to inform the public of 
their stances. That is all. Party strategy is only an 
adaptive effort. Whatever complicating factors are 
added (activists attitudes, organisational features, 
etc.), will only make the achievement of this pre­
defined adaptation more or less easy and efficient .
Type II is a variation of the theme. Keeping the 
exogenous formation of the structure of preferences, 
the simplification of the stable structure can be 
abandoned. Preferences can be modified even in the 
short term, but these modifications will be the result 
of factors external to party competition: cultural and 
value changes? Socio-structural modifications? Media 
coverage of events? It is not necessary to identify 
precisely the sources of change, but it is important 
to stress that in any case they are exogenous to the 




























































































case are just adaptive machines. They either can or 
cannot see the changes and the potential gains or 
losses associated with them, but they can neither 
influence them, nor how voters perceive them. 
Electoral competition is ethero-directed.
I do not want to discuss the realism or the
consequences of the assumption of the exogenous
formation of preferences. What interests me is that in 
this static perspective, the decidability problem 
becomes marginal by definitional fiat. If they cannot 
shape preferences, parties must adapt to them. Their 
offers are meant to meet autonomously formed 
preferences. If the offer is, for instance, not very 
decidable - that is, undifferentiated and unclear 
party stands predominate - this can only be the 
result of preferences. If preferences can not be 
influenced what other strategy can parties adopt? How 
can they, for instance, collude if their collusion 
does not modify the preferences of voters? How can 
they follow an alternative strategy of maximum 
decidability? The only basis on which they can decide 




























































































the given preferences. Any other solution will only 
expose them to totally unproductive risks. Once the 
preferences are made unmodifiable, the offer becomes 
but a function of such preferences. In this sense, I 
believe that the assumption of the exogenous nature of 
preferences implicitly contributes to the rendering 
irrelevant of the problem of the decidability of the 
offer.
Let's consider the situation in Type III. The picture 
changes: the structure of electoral preferences is not 
exogenous to party competition but is influenced, if 
not determined, by it. Parties and politicians believe 
they can influence the preference of electors. This 
implies that they can do something other than adapt; 
to get the electors on their side 37 . Adaptation to 
the structure of preferences and modification of the
structure of preferences interplay; begetting
different mix of adaptation and modification, and
debate about the degree of adaptation and
modification.
The structure of electoral preferences is changing and 




























































































parties and politicians do; depend on the offer. Party 
competition here is identified as the process through 
which parties and elites try to shape and modify to 
their advantage the structure of the electoral 
preferences. That is, exactly the contrary of what is 
postulated by rational choice theory. The way the 
electoral preferences are structured is not irrelevant 
to party competition, but is the object, essence and 
core of party competition itself. It is in the context 
of a 'preference shaping' type of competition that 
decidability becomes crucial.
Once decidability is regarded as a necessary condition 
for competition, deliberate strategies of increasing 
offer differentiation or of blurring party stances 
enter into empirical study. We must proceed from the 
recognition that political competition is built on a 
number of strong confining conditions of product 
differentiation. We can identify three processes of 
competition avoidance or restraint on the offer side:
1) those situations in which the very interest or 




























































































structure which strongly limits or even prohibits 
certain offers to be made;
2) those situations in which the interest and purpose 
of the suppliers are accessible to competition 
practices and competition as such is not limited, but 
the means through which it is pursued are more or less 
restricted;
3) those situations in which the interest and purpose 
of the suppliers are accessible to competition 
practices but competition is limited in its scope as a 
result of sheer collusion practices which supersede 
competition itself.
The first case concerns the socio-political capsule of 
competition. The set of norms, social practices and 
legal provisions which define the conditions of 
competition are normally protected from the basic 
principle of chance which operates in competition. The 
very interest and purpose of the group identify themes 
in which electoral competition, in terms of 
differentiated offers, is highly limited, as in the 




























































































solidarity, and more generally sets of formal and 
informal constitutional rules.
The second case is that of the restriction of the 
means through which competition obtains. The principle 
which supersedes competition is often that of the 
mechanical equality of the parts 38 . For instance, 
equality of competitive means is often invoked and 
aimed at by agreement on sharing equal access to 
television broadcasting, equal attention in written 
media, proportional access to public resources for 
electoral competition, or ceilings of the total amount 
of resources candidates and parties can invest in 
political advertising. Even the proper style of 
campaigning and political advertising may be the 
object of inter-individual (that is voluntarily 
reached) or super-individual (imposed by law or 
morality standards) limitations. The interesting 
question is whether the restriction of certain 
competitive means actually affects the substance of 
policy and issue competition. Certain restrictions do 
not limit competition, but, on the contrary, they 




























































































unnecessary elements. Preventing the diversion of 
competition from diminishing the capacity of 
competitors, these restrictions can force competition 
to concentrate on the offer itself. It is therefore 
possible for competitors to establish agreements in a 
specific area of competition without weakening it in 
other areas. These inter-individual restrictions may 
grow to free competition from all those things which 
do not constitute competition, because in principle 
they can cancel each other out without effect. As shop 
keepers can agree on fixed opening hours or sale 
periods, so political actors can agree on the muting 
or soft pedalling of certain means and techniques of 
competition. Yet, one should not forget that the means 
of competition consist, in some cases, of advantages 
offered to the third part, which may bear the brunt of 
the excessive restrictions on such means. These 
agreements can, in extreme cases, affect the very 
essence of competition, that is, to bring about forms 
of collusion and cartellisation that become plans for 





























































































This is in fact, the third form of restriction on 
competition which is the most important in this 
context. What is actually restricted is the scope of 
the offer in fields in principle accessible to 
political competition. The amount of forces and 
situations which lead to collusion and cartellisation 
practices among political competitors could scarcely 
be underestimated. First of all, politics is 
inherently collusive as a consequence of the 
exclusiveness of authority. The high threshold for 
access to authority requires a high degree of 
concentration of the market. The great deal of 
necessary coalition politics, is, in essence, 
cartellisation practice. In the processes of coalition 
making (electoral, parliamentary or governmental), 
policy positions, issues etc. are compromised, diluted 
or simply totally muted so as to obtain the economy 
of scale which is sought for. Coalition politics may 
indeed maximise other necessary conditions of 
competition (see below), but unquestionably they bring 





























































































The multiplicity of the sites of party interaction is 
a second incentive to collusion. Contrary to economic 
competition, political competition takes place in 
different and yet inter-linked sites or arenas. 
Parties compete in the electoral arena, but they then 
(as before) continue their interaction in other arenas 
like the legislative-parliamentary one and the 
governmental one. The same party may take different 
policy positions in the various arenas. Legislators 
group or regroup in different ways than they do at 
election time. The decidability of issues and policies 
may be voluntarily limited by the interplay of the 
electoral, legislative and governmental party systems. 
Opportunities to boost the salience of issues 
exploitable in the electoral arena, and which may 
concern sizeable sectors of public opinion, may not be 
taken up or may be dampened because they are damaging 
in other arenas; in light, for instance, of the 
potential consequences for the successive legislative 
bargaining. Possibilities in the legislative or 
governmental arena may be left unexplored because of 
the reluctance to expose oneself to the risk of an 




























































































terms. It is possible to defeat an incumbent 
government with alliances and tactical moves which, 
however, may be detrimental in the electoral channel 
if obliged to fight an election in those terms 39 .
In other words, the necessary interplay between 
electoral competition and legislative bargaining may 
lead to the downplay of those issues regarded as 
favourable in one arena but possibly damaging in 
another
40
Finally, collusion and cartellisation may be achieved 
through co-ordinated manipulation of issue saliency. 
Analytically, they can be classified as follows:
1) blurred and unclear party position or party policy 
on certain issues;
2) slow transformation of certain problems from clear 
partisan to valence issue;
3) transfer of certain issue from the domain of 
politically legitimised decision making to domains 




























































































The discussion of these situations will require far 
more space than that available in this paper. I limit 
the argument to a few points. The transformation of 
divisive issues in valence issues is a process which 
weakens decidability. Position issues are 'those that 
involve advocacy of government actions from a set of 
alternatives over which a distribution of voter 
preferences is defined. And ... 'valence' issues 
[are] those that merely involve the linking of the 
parties with some condition that is positively or 
negatively valued by the electorate' 41 . Position
issues are inherently divisive as they involve 
explicit for or against choices. Valence issues, on 
the contrary entail only one value (positive or 
negative) that is shared by the vast majority and they 
are essentially non-divisive 42 .
In an article devoted to the style of competition, 
Schneider proposes the following typology of issues 
which combines the clarity of the party stance
dimension with that of the more or less divisive 




























































































See Table 2 at page 87
The dimension of party choice, clear/non-clear, 
concerns whether the voter perceives a difference 
between the parties on a particular problem. This 
dimension, which
Schneider calls 'quality of choice' 44 , can be 
measured by voter ability to discriminate party 
positions and consequently, voter shifts correlated 
with issue positions. The 'divisiveness' dimension 
points to issues being defined more as position or 
more as valence. The two together refer to the 
decidability of the offer.
Since position issues are divisive, by definition the 





























































































For 'valence issues’ the question is more complex. A 
'choice' in position terms is simply the anticipation 
that one solution is better than the other, and that, 
therefore, it makes sense to change or not to change •
In the case of valence issues, choice essentially 
comes down to the question of whether one party can do 
better than the other that which is defined as a 
matter of general and agreed concern. The choice of 
specific remedies and policies is less defined, being 
overshadowed by quartions of 'competence'. When a 
general solution is desired by the vast majority, the 
specific remedy is less in the forefront than is the 
general perception of the non incumbents to do better 
than the incumbents. 'The failure of choice would be 
evidenced by the widespread perception that no 
alternative government will work. The decision to vote 
one way or the other could mean little in terms of 
anticipated performance’ 45 .
From the point of view of what I regard as the 
decidability of the offer, divisive issues on which 




























































































the most decidable. Valence issues with a clear 
partisan orientation (election issue) may still be 
decidable. A valence issue is not divisive, but this 
does not imply that it is not controversial. Its 
salience, to whom is blame attributed, whether voters 
perceive a difference between parties in terms of 
priorities and performance, makes for its more or less 
controversial and debatable nature. The level of 
decidability seems to decline progressively when party 
stances are unclear and it is at its lowest when, at 
the same time, issues are not divisive. If parties can 
shape preferences through competition, they will tend 
to do so by defining issues as more or less divisive 
and by making their stances more or less well defined. 
That is by manipulating decidability.
Sheer removal of issue from the agenda is a more 
complicated but not infrequent solution. Issues and 
policy offer may be removed by 'constitutionalising' 
them or by referring them to other domains of 
legitimation of decision making. By 
1constitutionalisation', I mean the 




























































































be kept safely out of the policy domain regulated by 
parties. If the requirement of no public deficit (or 
of a maximum public deficit), or the prohibition of 
sending armed forced outside the national territory 
are constitutionalised, then the issue is to a large 
extent removed from public debate, and the need for 
parties and candidates to take clear stands is reduced 
correspondingly. Alternatively, issues and policies 
can be transferred to domains where legitimation 
principles other than political exist. Issues may be 
pre-defined and left to the decisions of bodies where 
competence is the key resource: defending the value of 
the currency can be defined as an institutional goal 
and thus made the preserve of central bank 
authorities; controlling the political fairness of the 
mass media can be devolved to bodies and authorities 
on the basis of the same principle. Issues and 
policies may also be pre-defined and pre-decided by 
internationally accepted or imposed priorities and 
goals (EEC decisions; IMF requirements, GATT 
agreements, etc.) which may be used by political 
parties as a defence against taking clear political 




























































































policies can be left to the actors who control the 
resources for their implementation 46 ; to forms of 
'negotiated order' in which key economic actors agree 
to regulate macro-economic policies of interest to the 
parts 47 . Whether the principle invoked is efficiency, 
competence, or resource control the actual result may 
be an important muting of party differentials in key 
domains. The amount of policies which are 'pre­
defined' and ' pre-decided ' in this way may be large 
and varies from country to country as well as over 
time.
This long list of potential sources of collusive 
behaviour on the part of political competitors for 
votes is not meant to ' denounce ' or otherwise ' fault ' 
these practices, but simply to bring attention to the 
point that their diffusion is a crucial empirical 
dimension in the study of the conditions of 
competitive politics 48 . However, there are barriers 
and obstacles to political cartellisation and 
collusion. The first is imperfect knowledge of the 
consequences of rivalry and of the profit of 




























































































parties/candidates are uncertain as to the profit of 
this strategy as opposed to an adversarial competitive 
strategy. The second obstacle is the difficulty of 
determining the division of profits among colluders. 
Parties may be in disagreement and/or scared of the 
potential disagreement over how the advantages of 
collusion should be then distributed. In the first 
case uncertainty concerns the unforeseen potential 
reactions of the voters. In the second case
uncertainty concerns the divisions of the advantages 
among the actors. In both cases, the result is rather 
unstable choices between more co-operative and more 
competitive relationships in the struggle for the 
vote.
It goes without saying that the investigation of the 
dimension of decidability is removed by fiat if the 
structure of preferences is taken as exogenous to 
party competition. In empirical reserach, it is 
impossible to postulate or take for granted
competition on the offer side. Laying too much 
emphasis on competition, we may easily forget that 




























































































classes' have much in common at stake to defend, that 
political elites can easily agree to share a value 
through the voluntarily equalisation of effort rather 
than fighting for it , that competition on the offer 
side is not a natural outcome and requires special 
conditions in order to flourish. Continous efforts are 
made to avoid it and therefore, continuos costs are 
met in order to preserve it 49 . Paraphrasing Gaetano 
Mosca’s famous point about military rule, the real 
question it is not why parties sometimes collude, but 
why they do not do so all the time.
Vulnerability
In economic life and theory, the existence of a given 
product does not preclude the existence of a different 
one that can be chosen instead. The products offered 
in a more or less decidable way to voters are mutually 
exclusive. Given the coercive nature of politics, if a 
policy is implemented a different policy cannot be 
implemented at the same time. There cannot be two 





























































































The exclusivity of policy and legislation rests on 
the exclusivity of government. There is a threshold 
for gaining the right to coerce
In economic life, a firm which sells 49% of a product 
is not a failure. In politics it may well be.
This basic difference is not often discussed in 
articles which focus on economic and political 
competition 50 . Vulnerability, originates from and is 
meaningful only in relation to the exclusivity of 
political authority. For this condition of 
competition, no analogy with the market and economic 
competition seems possible.
It is not necessary to discuss this problem at length 
as a rich literature already exists. Vulnerability may 
be defined as the possibility for an incumbent 
government to be ousted and replaced or otherwise 
modified in its composition as a result of changes in 




























































































has two psychological effects: 1) parties perceive 
the chance of gaining or loosing the exclusive good of 
public authority; 2) voters perceive an increase in 
the potential impact of their vote on the final 
outcome of governmental formation and/or renovation.
In the American context, there has been a great deal 
of post-war studies concerning this particular 
dimension of competition. The reference point of these 
studies was of course the American two party system, 
where it was easier to collapse several conditions of 
competition into the single one of vulnerability. 
Therefore, vulnerability is regarded as being 
basically the same thing as competition, although the 
phenomenon was given different names. The names range 
from 'closeness of the electoral outcome' to 
'uncertainty of the electoral result'; from 
'performance sensitivity’ to 'decisiveness of 
elections for governmental turnover'; from 
'changeability' 51 to 'competitiveness' or 'systemic 
competition'. The term 'performance sensitivity' 
implies that the incumbent position is vulnerable as a 




























































































performance when in government. This is to say and to 
demand far too much. The basic difference between the 
other terms is that some of them tend to stress actual 
aspects of governmental turnover, while others tend to 
stress the potential turnover. Schlesinger, for
instance, positively refers his concept of 
vulnerability to the 1) number of elections won by 
each party; and 2) the rapidity with which parties 
alternate in office. He argues that 'perhaps the 
rate of alternation is even more important in giving 
the participants a sense of competition than is the 
overall division of victories' 52 . Similarly,
'decisiveness' of elections for governmental outcome' 
or 'changeability' stress the actual result of 
competition. Insisting on actual alternation means 
that at every given moment the perception of the 
vulnerability of government is the result of past 
experiences. The obvious critique is that 
vulnerability may be present without actual turnover 
taking place or vice versa.
To stress 'closeness' of electoral returns in terms of 




























































































votes and seats 53 , or the concept of 'uncertainty' of 
electoral outcome' refers to the psychological effect
linked to the absence of safety, rather than the
actual result. Closeness and uncertainty may not
result into turnover but still provide their supposed 
effect on competition 54 . Yet, without any prior
information, how can the level of closeness or
symmetry which would guarantee vulnerability be
ascertained? What if close elections were repeated
over time with the same governmental outcome?
Both the dimension of actual past record and present 
uncertainty have to be incorporated into the idea of 
vulnerability. Some element of the objective closeness 
of electoral returns must give rise to a sense of 
unsafety for incumbents and a sense of opportunity for 
opponents, but at the same time this objective base 
can not be defined without reference to some record of 
past experience. For this reason, in the great variety 
of measures of electoral vulnerability experimented in 
the context of the federal and state level as well as 
for presidential, governors and legislative elections 




























































































measures which are expressed in the form of a ratio 
between some objective element of closeness of the 
race at a given moment and some objective element 
indicating the past competitive performance of the 
system. I regard as very interesting Stern's measure 
56 . In a given unit (local township in his case), he 
takes the vote for the majority party/candidate and 
relates it to the standard deviations of the same 
majority vote in the previous elections. If that vote 
minus two standard deviations is still over 50%, then 
the government is safe. If that vote minus two 
standard deviations is below 50% but the same vote 
minus one standard deviation is above 50% then the 
contest is classified as marginal. If that vote minus 
a standard deviation falls below 50% than government 
is competitive. In so doing, Stern's measure links the 
majoritarian advantage of the winning party to the 
past variability of this margin 57 . If one were to 
substitute the three terms 'safe', 'marginal' and 
'competitive' with the single dimension of the level 
of vulnerability, we go from a minimum vulnerability 
in the first case to the maximum in the latter. I am 




























































































measure that shares the same logic. For each given 
election, I consider the distance from the majority 
thresholds of each party/vocation/candidate. This 
distance is then related to the average aggregate 
volatility of previous elections along the incumbent 
versus non-incumbent dimension. For instance, a 10% 
margin over the 50% threshold does not give a secure 
indication of the real or perceived vulnerability of 
the incumbent unless it is related to the average 
aggregate voting switch which takes place between 
incumbents and the opposition. If that average 
aggregate voting shift is 20%, that a 10 % margin does 
not make for safety. If, on the contrary, it is only 
2%, then a 10 % majority distance makes for
considerably little vulnerability 58 . The same level 
of closeness of the votes between government and 
opposition makes government safe in a system with low 
electoral availability along the line which separate 
majority and opposition, and vulnerable in a system 
with high volatility.
There is no need to discuss at any great length this 




























































































the elements of uncertainty and unsafety associated 
with the concept of incumbents' vulnerability are not 
fully tapped by measures of closeness or distance 
alone. Something is required which indicates the 
perception of incumbents and opponents about the 
likeliness of that distance to be matched by aggregate 
voters shifts. Symmetry of voting can be a good proxy 
for information we do not have, but strictly speaking 
it is not adequate.
Vulnerability is a system property. It refers to the 
unit of the party system. It results from specific 
configurations of the number, the strength and the 
alliance-opposition relationships among the units of 
the system without belonging to any of them. It 
presents important empirical links with other 
conditions of competition like contestability, 
availability and decidability, but it is independent 
from all of them. Only two conditions can be regarded 
as necessary for the maximisation of governmental 
vulnerability:





























































































2) an average electoral availability along the 
incumbent/opposition line large enough to approach (or 
bypass) the majority margin of incumbents.
In relation to the first condition, the visibility of 
the incumbents/opposition camps is decisively blurred 
in cases of : 1) greatly oversized majorities; 2) 
truly minority government (to the extent that they 
rest on collusion with the opposition in parliament);
3) frequent change in government composition during 
the legislature. Truly minority government poses a 
special challenge to the concept of vulnerability. 
Minority governments are vulnerable by definition as 
their survival rests on some sort of collusion with
n o n - g o v e r n m e n t a l  p a r t i e s . H o w e v e r ,  t h e i r h i g h
p a r l i a m e n t a r y  v u l n e r a b i l i t y may r e s u l t i n t h e i r
e l e c t o r a l  i n v u l n e r a b i l i t y . T h e p r o b l e m i s w h a t
e l e c t o r a l  ( n o n  p a r l i a m e n t a r y )  m e c h a n i s m  w o u l d  m a k e  a  
m i n o r i t y  g o v e r n m e n t  v u l n e r a b l e .  O ne c a n  i m a g i n e  t h a t  
m i n o r i t y  g o v e r n m e n t s  a r e  r e l a t i v e l y  i n s e n s i t i v e  t o  
e l e c t o r a l  r e t u r n s  b e c a u s e  t h e i r  raison d'être  i s  n o t  
e l e c t o r a l .  A t  t h e  s a m e  t i m e  we a r e  n o t  p r e p a r e d  t o  g o  




























































































irrelevant to them. We have to find some better 
argument than the 'non applicable' one in this case.
As far as the second condition is concerned, it is 
often argued that what matters for vulnerability is 
more the 'decisive location' of the available 
electorate than its sheer quantity (although one can 
say that the higher the quantity the higher the 
likelihood that a sufficient share of it will be 
locate so as to contribute to vulnerability). The 
'decisive location' of available voters is 
unquestionably crucial only if a spatial 
representation of politics is given. Whether a spatial 
dimension of politics exists (in the electorate), the 
amount of dimension it has and how good an instrument 
to describe concrete historical situation it is, 
remain empirical questions. Therefore, we can not make 
the 'decisive location' a necessary condition. What 
matters is 'sufficient' incumbent/opposition electoral 
availability. Spatial location can not be incorporated 
as a 'necessary' condition for vulnerability . As for 
'symmetry' (or closeness) of the vote/seats 




























































































condition, I have already argued that it is not. It 
can, perhaps, be considered a facilitating one.
The relationship among the different dimensions of 
competition
In Table 3, I have summarised the main points 
concerning the four dimensions of competition when it 
is regarded as a process leading to elite 
responsiveness to voters preferences. The four 
conditions of contestability versus closure, 
availability versus encapsulation, decidability versus 
collusion and vulnerability versus safety of tenure, 
identify dimensions which can be maximised or 
minimised. If contestability is minimised, the process 
can go so far as to endanger pluralism, which is also, 
as we said, a defining condition of democracy. Beyond 
the minimum necessary level of pluralism, 
contestability can vary, but a maximisation of 
contestability is likely to bring about excessive 
fragmentation on the offer side. When the forces of 
voter encapsulation are so strong as to lead to the 
extinction of electoral availability, then electoral 




























































































to the political offer, it is unlikely that buyers 
will be found. On the other hand, the maximisation of 
electoral availability points to a situation in which 
every voter is likely to change his/her mind. The 
consequence is an exceptional volatility from election 
to election.
See Table 3 at page 88
When decidability is brought to a minimum, party 
positions on issues and policies are blurred and 
unclear, issues tend to slide from 'divisive' to 
'valence' or to be simply muted and/or transferred to 
another domain of decision making different from the 
electoral political channel. Consequences of collusive 
tendencies may include growing political 
dissatisfaction, voter defection and even mass 




























































































is defined in which the maximisation of decidability 
brings about very high policy differentials and a very 
adversarial style of politics. This tendency can 
result into clear ideological polarisation. Finally, 
safety of governmental tenure strongly undermines 
responsiveness. Yet, maximisation of vulnerability has 
its owns drawbacks. In the extreme case it could bring 
about a 'permanent campaign' syndrome 59 : frequent 
feedback on government popularity, on the relative 
salience of issue in the mass public, and on the 
preference of the public (even on issues not yet 
articulated by the opinion makers); more awareness by 
citizens of governmental actions or possible actions 
and better chances to react more visibly to them; 
correspondingly, governments' sense of being more 
exposed to political pressures from the general 
public; constant watching of opinion polls by 
politicians in order to evaluate the response of 
public opinion to policy options
; politicians belief in their capacity to immediatly 
estimate the costs in terms of support for specific 
decisions (far greater than the capacity to appreciate 




























































































postponement of critical and divisive decisions by 
elected officials for fear of alienating potential 
supporters.
It follows that each dimension impinges on the other 
not in a linear and additive way, but in a rather 
contradictory one. High contestability may allow high 
fragmentation. Intense minorities may find it more 
preferable to enter the electoral race than to 
articulate their demands within more encompassing 
political parties, even if motivated by single-issues 
or small range concerns . This is likely to have a
negative effect on the clear distinction between 
government and opposition, and therefore on 
vulnerability. High vulnerability may lead to low 
decidability and no differentiation of the political 
offer. 'Perfect' vulnerability is achieved when two 
parties(coalitions) of equal size compete for a few 
median voters (in theory just for the median voter). 
Unless the degree of contestability allows for 
credible third party alternatives, party willingness 
to shape clear and alternative choices to voters is 




























































































decidability, one needs a certain amount of electoral 
availability which is not functional to vulnerability. 
At the same time, excessively volatile electorates, 
resulting for declining cultural and organisational 
ties, may bring about an issue or policy 'balkanised' 
electorate with no dimensionality whatsoever 61 . A 
certain amount of vote identification and vote 
stability is necessary to
allow parties to plan the offer, to interpret the 
reaction of the electorate, and to reduce the risks of 
collusion resulting from their failing in this 
respect.
In my view, a conspicuously attractive interaction 
takes place between decidability and vulnerability. 
Decidability requires clear alternative choices: a 
clear-cut policy or programmatic profile of candidates 
and parties (coalitions); no muting of major and 
divisive issues; no transformation of divisive issues 
in valence issue. Vulnerability rests on institutional 
solutions which avoid fragmentation (majority 
formula), and allow clear attribution of political 




























































































responsibility). It also rests on political 
conditions: no disagreement on fundamentals (avoid 
that performance evaluation be overshadowed by 
consideration of system defence); a broad electoral 
coalition open to all sectors of the population; the 
absence of polarising ideological issues; the 
bypassing of the historical divisions and the 
identities linked to them; a strong orientation of the 
vote toward performance-evaluation.
To what extent are these two sets of conditions 
mutually compatible? Is it possible to simultaneously 
maximise decidability and vulnerability? Probably not. 
A vicious circle may exists in which increasing 
responsiveness implies increasing credibility of 
sanctions for incumbents; the latter implies that 
increasingweight is given to median voter preferences 
by both governing and opposition parties; the latter 
implies the increasing non-differentiation of 
political offer, declining policy competition, 
declining decidability and, finally, reduced 
responsiveness to preferences. Certainly, sensitive 




























































































t o  h a v e  t h e i r  p r e f e r e n c e s  c o n s i d e r e d  i s  l i n k e d  t o  
t h e i r  c h a n c e  o f  o b t a i n i n g  a n  a l t e r n a t i v e  new  p a r t y .  
M a x i m i s i n g  c o m p e t i t i o n  a s  v u l n e r a b i l i t y  i n  t h e  a b s e n c e  
o f  e a s y  e x i t  o p t i o n s  w i l l  r e s u l t  i n  t h e  w i d e n i n g  o f  
w h a t  M a t t h e w s  c a l l s  t h e  ' i d e o l o g i c a l  g a p '  b e t w e e n  
g o v e r n m e n t a l  p o s i t i o n s  a n d  s e c t i o n s  o f  t h e  e l e c t o r a t e  
62 . T h e  n e e d  t o  b e  ' c o m p e t i t i v e '  a t  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t a l
l e v e l m ay p r e v e n t  p a r t i e s f r o m t a k i n g s t a n d s o n
c o n t r o v e r s i a l  a n d  d i v i s i v e i s s u e s . I n  s i t u a t i o n s o f
h i g h v u l n e r a b i l i t y  e s t a b l i s h e d p a r t i e s may b e
u n w i l l i n g  t o  t a k e  t h e  r i s k  o f  i d e n t i f y i n g  c l e a r l y  w i t h  
p o l i c i e s  a n d  i s s u e s  h i g h l i g h t i n g  t h e  c o s t  t o  b e  
s h a r e d  b y  s p e c i f i c  g r o u p s  i n  e x c h a n g e  f o r  b r o a d l y  
c o l l e c t i v e  a d v a n t a g e s  w h o s e  e l e c t o r a l  r e t u r n s  a r e  
u n c e r t a i n .  I n  t h e s e  s i t u a t i o n s ,  t h e r e  i s  a  s t r o n g  
i n c e n t i v e  t o  d e f i n e  i s s u e s  i n  s u i c h  a  w ay  t h a t  n o  
o p p o s i n g  s i d e s  a r e  i d e n t i f i a b l e ,  a n d  t o  p u s h  p a r t i e s  
t o  a r g u e  m o r e  a b o u t  w ho i s  m o r e  c o m p e t e n t  o r  c a p a b l e  
o f  a s s u r i n g  t h e  a c h i e v e m e n t  o f  c o n s e n s u a l l y  a c c e p t e d  
p r i n c i p l e s ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  a r g u i n g  a b o u t  w h i c h
p r i n c i p l e s  s h o u l d  b e  e m b o d i e d  i n  p o l i c y .  F o r  t h e s e  
r e a s o n s ,  n ew  p a r t i e s  e m e r g e  w h i c h  c o n c e n t r a t e  o n  




























































































problems. Having no traditional constituency to 
defend, they can appeal across partisan lines. 
However, if new parties are needed for taking partisan 
stands on new issues, then a decline in the 
vulnerability at the system level may well be the 
result, so that what is gained in decidability is lost 
in vulnerability of incumbents.
Some recent tendencies of electioneering 63 , with 
their stress on candidate-centric campaigning, on fund 
raising as 'primary', on heavy concentration on radio 
and television campaign, packaging of candidates by 
professional advisers, well prepared, media controlled 
public appearances, parading before carefully screened 
audiences (up to the point of reducing appearances to 
chat-shows and 'infomericals') are the correlate of 
high leadership vulnerability, but they also tend to 
deprive the public, even the most informed part of it, 
of any real choice.
There may be too much pragmatism and incrementalism, 
as has been suggested, and the bringing of 




























































































welcomed. The increasing sharpness of policy 
alternatives will provide voters with the opportunity 
of making choices between clear-cut policy sets 64 . 
But there might also be too little influence of voters 
on government and leadership selection, as others 
argue. Thus, we should welcome the bringing about of 
coalition formula, of electoral institutions, of forms 
of government, of chief executive selection which will 
provide the voter with a direct say in the selection 
of alternative government. If we call the first good 
' to have a choice' and the second ' to have a say' , we 
end up with a difficult predicament: choice without 
say or say without choice.
An empirical study of competition has no way to escape 
its contradictory multi-dimensionality. This can only 
be avoided by stipulative decisions or assumptions. If 
the various conditions or dimensions of competition 
have complex relationships among themselves, this 
means that electoral competition cannot be conceived 
as a linear process going from zero or a minimum to a 
maximum, theoretically definable as 'perfect 




























































































from economics but it is not applicable in politics if 
we agree that the parallel maximisation of all 
conditions of competition is not only impossible, 
because of the afore mentioned interactive effect 
among them, but also detrimental. One can not 
therefore speak of more or less competition, but 
rather of a different mix of contestability, 
availability, decidability and vulnerability, without
being able to incorporate them into the single
dimension of competition. The level of actual
competition in any given setting is a point moving in 
a four dimensional space where no equilibrium can be 
found as the maximisation of one dimension comes at 
the expense of the others. It is necessary to abandon 
the analysis of an optimised system and to concentrate 
on the , study of which alternative decisions are 
available and valid in practice. If all possible 
maximisation present weakness, unintended or 
contradictory results, then all reference to full 
information, to vote maximisiation, to perfect 
vulnerability etc., are irrelevant from the operative 
point of view. It is better to concentrate on 




























































































a different mix of each dimension can be evaluated 
only via choices motivated in each historical 
circumstance by the most needed values sought. We end 
up where we started: what form of competition and how 
much competition bring us back to the definition of 
the ' social value' that needs to be maximised in any 
given case.
Competition is not a defining characteristic of 
democracy but a property of which there can be more or 
less. However, it is not a uni-dimensional phenomenon 
which can be studied 'under optimal conditions'. If 
competition has to perform producing valuable (to 
third part) unintended effects of political 
interaction, it must remain within relatively narrow 
boundaries. Those conditions which in an optimal model 
perspective limit and contain competition, at the same 
time sustain it and make it viable. The set of 
normative factors, of social bonds, and of legal and 
institutional provisions 66 which shape group 
loyalties and identifications, which determine a 
certain amount of collusive practices and which 




























































































limiting both its scope and means, do not represent 
elements of 'imperfection', but conditions of 
viability. Obviously the factors which contain 
competition can be so powerful, encompassing and tight 
that the restraint on competition can suppress it 
altogether. At the same time, these confining 
conditions can be so weak that they do not have the 
capacity to contain competition, whose effects in 
different domains of political life can be detrimental 
to the same beneficial effects competition is thought 
to produce. Political competition needs constraining- 
sustaining conditions as it is unlikely to be 
effective in a world of rational, maximising, selfish 
























































































































































































1 G. Simmel, Conflict and The Web of Group Affiliation, New York, The Free Press, 1955 (or. ed. 
1908 and 1922), in particular pp. 58-85,
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I Ibid., pp. 59-60
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individualistic competition, in so far as it too is a mean to super-individual ends attainment. Ibid., p. 
74.
’ Although differences exist in the definition of this power: votes, offices, influence on policy.
‘ J. A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1954 
(4th ed.); A  Downs, An Economic Theory o f Democracy, New York, Harper & Row, 1957.
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'  J. A. Schumpeter, op. cit., p. 269.
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II A. Downs, op. cit., p. 19, footnote n. 11.
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14 J. A. Schumpeter, op. cit., p. 269 and p. 282 respectively.
11 An exhaustive review may identify different social values regarded as by-products of competition. 
For instance, a  number of authors of economic formation define such unintended result as the 
'elimination of unnecessary returns to party leaders and functionaries', where unnecessary returns are 
seemingly defined in terms of spoils. See G. J. Stigler, 'Economic Competition and Political 
Competition', Public Choice, 13 (1972), pp. 91-106. However, the only condition regarded as 
indispensable to avoid unnecessary returns is contestability. So it is not necessary to discuss this 
position, already implicit in the Schumpeterian vision.
“ The most obvious example being equal or universal suffrage.
17 For the discussion of the conditions of democracy see R. Dahl, Poliarchy: Participation and 
Opposition, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1971, p. 3 and ff. Note that he lists among them the 
right to compete for electoral support, but he does not go so far as to include political competition as 
such.
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Availability, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990.
21 In a short discussion of the concept of competition K. Strom has mentioned three 'models' of party 
competition, labelling them 'contestability', 'conflict of Interest' and 'performance sensitivity1;
'Interparly Competition In Advanced Democracies’, Journal o f Theoretical Politics, 1 (1989), pp. 280- 
281. The definition of his first ‘models' roughly corresponds to what l will discuss under the same 
label. The second does not correspond to any of my conditions. The third mixes aspects that I will 
discuss separately under the label of availability and decidability.
22 R. D'Alimonte, 'Democrazia e competizione', Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica, 19 (1989), pp. 301- 
319, in particular p. 301, p. 302 and p. 303.
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The Free Press, 1968, voi. 3, pp. 181-82.
“  J. K. Clark, 'Toward a Concept of Workable Competition', American Economic Review, 30 (1940), 
pp. 241-256.
27 Ideology Is introduced in a second stage, to reduce the implicit huge information costs.
“  By 'sensitivity' Is normally meant 'issue sensitivity'. Against this term three basic criticism were 
advanced:
a) according to the findings of the early American public opinion studies, issue voting is not separated 
from party voting. See A. Campbell, P. E. Converse, W . E. Miller and D. E. Stakes, The American 
Voter: An Abridgement, New York, Wiley, 1964, p. 78;
b) the term issue-sensitive is not correct because anyway there are inconsistencies in the 
presentation of issues (i.e. it is not easy to know where parties-candidates stand on each issues; very 
often ambiguous and confused stances). So an issue-sensitive voter could not make-up his mind. 
See D. Robertson, A Theory o f Party Competition, London, Wiley, 1976, p. 13 for a  list of such 
Inconsistencies in party messages and stances;
c) issue voting in inherently multi-dimensional and cannot be reduced to a uni-dimensional space. So 
spatial models work poorly with respect to issues and issue-voting . See G. Sartori, Parties and Party 
Systems. A Framework for Analysis, Cambridge (Mass.), Cambridge University Press, 1976, pp. 330- 
333, who prefers to speak of party images as condensed issue-packages.
In the context of this argument, my definition of the available voter does not make reference to the 
origins of this availability, to how the available voter makes up his mind, and to whether his/her 
position can be represented in spatial terms.
” On these measures see S. Bartolini, 'La volatilità elettorale', Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica, 16 
(1986), pp. 363-400; and S. Bartolini and P. Mair, op. cit., pp. 20-37.
”  For a  review of individual level volatility studies based on the transition matrices technique see D. 
Denver, Conclusion, in I. Crewe and D. Denver (ed.), Electoral Change in Western Democracies; A 
Framework for Analysis, London, Croom Helm, 1985 , pp. 400-412.
11 C. van der Eljk and E. V. Oppenhuis, 'European Parties' Performance in Electoral Competition', 




























































































” A. Downs, op. Clt., pp. 38-40.
”  'A Theory of the Calculus of Voting', American Political Science Review, 62 (1968), pp. 25-43 and 
An Introduction to Positive Political Theory, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall, 1973. They formalise this 
calculus In the following equation:
R = P B -C ,  
where
R= the expected net utility of voting less the utility of abstaining:
P = the probability of affecting the outcome;
B = the differential benefits over outcomes (the party differential); 
C = the cost of voting.
“ M. Laver and W . B. Hunt, Policy and Party Competition, London, Routledge, 1992, p. 3 . 1 will make 
reference to this work that discusses and summarise the position of rational choice theory on the 
issue.
How this postulate Is essentli to formal modelling is stated several time In the book. A number of 
critical notes concerning the postulate of exogenous preferences are in P. Dunleavy and H. Ward, 
'Exogenous Voter Preference' and Parties with State Power: Some Internal Problems of Economic 
Theories of Party Competition', British Journal o f Political Science, 11 (1981), pp. 352-363. Also 
relevant for the debate about preference shaping or preference adapting competition is P. Dunleavy, 
Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice, New York, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991, 112-144.
“ Laver and Hunt
make the hypothesis that the structure of preference in the electorate could be shaped by party 
competition Itself. But this is a  rather scholastic and rapidly discarded hypothesis :
'If the aims of the theorist are relatively modest, relating to patterns observed at a  particular election 
or to a short sequence of elections, then the structure of electoral preference may be taken as given' 
(Ibid., p. 10). They add that this assumption ‘may seem on the face of it to be a  relatively non 
controversial approach to take, though it seems so mainly because such matters have largely been 
ignored by both pure theorists and empirical researchers' (ibid., p. 11). Therefore, the choice is a 
matter of faith' and they 'make no bones about putting our faith In the assumption that tastes are 
exogenous to party competition' (Ibid., p. 3).
*  It can be conceived as an heuristic simplification. If the current structure of electoral preferences 
was shaped by past party activities, there are good reasons to believe that the future structures will be 
determined by current party activities. Even In presence of a  stable short term structure, one can 
work for the bringing about of a  different one. A party may find itself cut off from chances of victory 
given the existing structure of preferences of the electorate, but it is not necessarily compelled to 
adapt Itself to this structure. Given that what it does may determine future changes In the voters' 
preferences, party competition Is not only an adaptive effort.
”  Downs too assumes preferences of voters as being intrinsic, that is shaped by some force which is 
both prior and independent from party competition. However in a  small passage he states: though 
parties will move Ideologically to adjust to the distribution, under some circumstances, they will also 
attempt to move voters toward their own location, then altering it' [the distribution], op. cit., p. 140. 
This remark is not developed In the work because it implied a  revision of the whole model, entirely 
anchored on the solid rock of the distribution of voters' preferences. Downs' successors have more 




























































































“ See the notes by Slmmel, op. cit., pp. 74-76, who discusses the cases of corporations.
”  Two 'pure' example of the consequences in different arenas of party choices about the decidability 
of the electoral offer are represented by the Dutch Socialists strategy In the 1977 elections and the 
Italian Lega In the 1994 elections. The first made their positions far more decidable, opting for an 
adversarial strategy, with the result of winning the electorate but loosing the government. The second, 
in blurring their profile In a  large alliance may have won the government but lost the electorate.
40 A clear presentation of the linkages between the different arenas of the party system is In M. 
Laver, 'Party Competition and Party System Change. The Interaction of Coalition Bargaining and 
Electoral Competition’, Journal o f Theoretical Politics, 1( 1989), 301-324, esp. pp. 302-305.
41 D. E Stokes, Spatial Models o f Party Competition, in A. Campbell et al, Elections and the Political 
Order, New York, John Wiley, 1966, pp. 61-179, In particular pp. 170-173. Valence Issue can be 
defined as non-dimensional issues, that Is Issues which can not help to order preferences In spatial 
terms.
41 Budge and Fariie present an alternative view of issues. The classic argument of having parties 
located at, say, 30% versus 60% welfare spending assumes that both parties take stands on the 
'same' Issue.
They have argued that parties may try to compete by manipulating the salience of different issue 
dimensions. That Is, giving prominence and emphasis to those issues on which they are strong and 
which are more favourable to them and, at the same time, downplaying those on which they feel 
weaker.
If parties do so, it may result that instead of talking about the same problems, they talk about 
different problems and what decides the election is the preference of electors for a type of Issues 
'owned' by a  type of party. See I. Budge and D. Fariie, Explaining and Predicting Elections: issues, 
Effects and Party Strategies in Twenty-three Democracies, London, Alien & Unwin, 1983, pp. 152- 
155.
4) W.
Schneider, Styles o f Competition, in R. Rose (ed.), Electoral Participation, A Comparative Analysis, 
London, Sage, 1980, pp. 91-97. The centrality of 'divisiveness' was underlined also In an earlier 
paper: 'Issues, Voting, and Cleavages: A Methodology and Some Tests', American Behavioral 
Scientist, 18 (1974), pp. 111-146.
44 W.
Schneider, Styles o f Competition, cit., p. 93.
“ Ibid., p. 82.
44 The extreme case of the devolution of political issues to forces controlling resources for 
Implementation Is when they are left to the market forces.
47 An Interesting open question Is whether these negotiated order Impose themselves in situation of 
ineffective politico-electoral competition or do they determine the enfeeblement of such competition. 
When existing, such orders reduce the scope of electoral policy competition as policy is decided 
elsewhere. At the same time, they also require as a prerequisite such reduction of the scope of 
electoral competition. Actually the dynamics of electoral competition should normally represent a  
mechanism of Instability for such negotiated orders. Actors aiming at the electoral conquest of office 
could challenge such orders, reserving for themselves the right to accept or refuse them in view of 
their electoral goals.
44 Attention to this point, with particular reference to the developemnt in party organisation, is given in 
R. Katz and P. M a lr ,' 'Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence 
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The term 'electoral' or 'party competition' is 
utilised either as a loose term for the entire cycle 
of electoral, parliamentary and governmental politics, 
or in the context of the formal modelling of party 
strategies and voting choices within the narrow limits 
of assumptions about actors' motives, preferences, and 
information, or in descriptive accounts of particular 
election campaigns, party platforms and statements, 
etc. The use of the term 'competition' in titles of 
papers, the discussion of the concept itself and its 
measurement have grown in political science literature 
since W.W.II. Still the concept remains vague and 
ambiguous. Its exact theoretical meaning and the kind 
of empirical phenomena that are indicated by it are 
unclear for two reasons.
Firstly, too much is borrowed from the economic theory 
of competition. The assumed fundamental analogy, 
similarity or resemblance between economic and 
political competition is erroneous. Competition in 
politics is altered by the degree of collusion that is 
inherent in the achievement of the exclusive good of 




























































































of degree. Secondly, like economists, political 
scientists, tend to view competition as a uni­
dimensional phenomenon; as a single property of which 
there can be more or less and whose upper limit is a 
model of 'perfect' competition. On the contrary 
however, the conditions of competition in politics are 
manifold. Moreover, they neither covary, nor do their 
maximisation point or reach 'perfection'.
This paper argues these points taking the lead from 
the unintended 'social value' which is the by-product 
of competition in politics. This value is taken as the 
yardstick for discussing the conditions that need to 
be met in order for competition to produce it. The 
paper analyses these conditions, claiming that their 
parallel maximisation is impossible. The debate about 
political competition must concern the different 
dimensions and conditions of competition a society 
wants to maximise in specific historical situations.
The unintended 'social value' of competition
From the early, almost implicit, appraisal of the 




























































































competition has achieved a generalised and explicit 
recognition as an adequate and valuable technique for 
the satisfaction of almost any need and the attainment 
of almost any value in almost any sphere of human 
activity. The exceptional value attributed to the 
parallel efforts by several parties to obtain the same 
prize is surprising when one considers the number of 
fields in which the principle of subordination of 
individual efforts to the collective goal is still 
prevalent and legitimised: both private and public 
bureaucracies, productive processes, family circles 
and kinship groups. Yet, the 'ideological' trend 
nowadays prizes competition as the default and 
prevalent mode. Other principles or techniques of 
individual forces co-ordination need ad hoc 
justification and legitimation and are reserved to 
fields where competition is regarded as unattainable 
or not yet attainable. Whether the satisfaction of 
human needs and desires and the creation of values is 
to be left to the competition of individual forces or 
to their co-ordination in view of a collectively 




























































































The social legitimacy of competition rests on a point: 
the net result of competition among individuals for 
the same prize produce an overall result which is 
advantageous to a 'third part1. The third gaining part 
can be identified in individualistic premises as well 
as in functionalist or systemic ones. In the first 
perspective, the third gaining part is a collective 
welfare function maximising each individual function. 
In the second perspective the advantage is the 
realisation of some overall value which is positive 
from the systemic point of view. Georg Simmel has 
analysed the sociological mechanism of this 
transformation of individual impulses into socially 
valuable results1 . From the formal point of view 
competition rests on an individualistic principle; the 
refusal of the subordination of every individual 
interest and effort to a uniform supra-individual (or 
group) interest. Competition assumes that each 
competitor pursues his/her interest, utilising his/her 
energies according to such interest, and evaluates the 
results in terms of objective accomplishments. In the 
form of 'pure' competition, unlike other forms of 




























































































not in the hands of either adversary. In 'pure' 
competition 'each competitor by himself aims at the 
goal, without using its strength on the adversary... 
from a superficial standpoint, it proceeds as if there 
existed no adversary, but only the aim' 2 .
Competition presupposes, therefore, the existence of a 
common aim, of an objective value desired by all 
competing parties; be it profit, glory, scientific 
prestige or power. However, the social legitimation 
element of competition is that the subjective 
antagonistic efforts that lead to the realisation of 
the objective value desired by the competitors, 
determine as a by-product the realisation of other 
values outside it. The final result of those 
antagonistic efforts transform them into an ultimate 
goal , while from the point of view of the individual 
competitor, this ultimate goal is neither wanted nor
aimed at. In this mechanism lies the value of
competition for the social circle of which the
competitors are members. 'From the standpoint of the 
society [competition] offers subjective motives as the 




























































































the standpoint of the competing parties, it uses the 
production of objective values as means for attaining 
subjective satisfaction' 3 . Thus, competition is 
legitimised from the collective point of view through 
its capacity to overcome, and indeed deny, the tension 
between subjective and collective goals.The latter are 
satisfied by the objective results of competition as 
opposed to the subjective goals of competitors.
Although resting on the individualistic principle of 
non subordination of subjective goals, competition 
finds its legitimation in the fulfilment of socially 
desirable ends. The latter justifies the losses 
incurred by individuals in the process. In this sense, 
individualistic competition should not be seen as 
opposed to the exclusivity or predominance of the 
'social interest', but rather to other 'techniques' 
for the attainment of the same social interest. The 
relationship between competition and individualism is 
not complete without the legitimising reference to the 
social interest. The legitimation of individualistic 




























































































of competing 'techniques' for the co-ordination of 
individual efforts to achieve collective goals 4 .
Schumpeter, Downs and the 'social value' of political 
competition
This conception of the valuable by-product of 
competition has been extended to politics relatively 
later than in other fields. The objective value prized 
by antagonistic individuals and groups in the
political sphere is usually identified with political 
power 5 . The socially valuable by-product of this 
antagonistic struggle for power is, however, less 
clearly defined.
A short answer is that competition produces as by­
product democracy. The answer is inadequate.
Competition presupposes the existence of sets of 
norms and rules which offer at least a minimal 
regulatory framework without which it can well 
degenerate into utter unregulated conflict. Democracy 
as a set of basic rights and of respected procedures 
is a necessary condition for political and electoral 





























































































round. Pluralism, which is a necessary condition of 
democracy, need not be 'competitive'. Other principles 
may and do regulate the interaction among a plurality 
of actors. Whether politico-electoral competition has 
a feedback effect in maintaining, defending, 
stabilising or otherwise improving the basic 
constitutional capsule of democracy and/or its 
pluralism is another matter, but it does not change 
the logical priority of the latter with respect to the 
former.
With their influential works Schumpeter and Downs6 
are the forerunners of the 'third gaining part axiom' 
of competition in the political realm. Their work is 
well known and there is no need to recast it here 
except for a few points and general implications of 
their approach. Schumpeter's innovation is to render 
irrelevant all motivations of political elites with 
the exception of their shared appetite for power. Once 
channelled within a 'social capsule' 7 of norms and 
procedures defining appropriate and acceptable means, 
these appetites tend to produce social values which 




























































































entire society. There is no need to assume that those 
social values are consciously aimed at by parties in 
the competitive struggle. This notion presented 
several advantages. It saved the normative character 
of democracy by attributing to voters the role of 
ultimate instance of selection of their rulers. At the 
descriptive level, it enabled the renunciation of the 
unrealistic degree of political competence, 
initiative and altruism required by other theories of 
democracy that Schumpeter labelled 'classic'. It 
facilitated the unambigous distinction between 
democratic and non democratic systems, through the 
exclusivity of the popular sanction of government by 
elections. Finally, it helped to rephrase the dilemma 
of 'classic theories' concerning the democracy- 
authority relationship . It avoided that the 
Leviathan, once legitimised by a social contract, be 
free to operate for the common good.
Schumpeter makes aclose link between competition and 
democracy. His definition of democracy is 'government 
approved by people' and the democratic system is 




























































































a free, fair and loyal electoral competition. The
democratic method is only 'the institutional
instrument to arrive at political decisions on the 
bases of which single individuals obtain the power to 
decide through a competition which has as object the 
popular vote' 8 . The procedures which constitute 
democracy are the constitutional aspect of politico- 
electoral competition; the social capsule of
competition. Actually, his theory is more a theory of 
democracy than one of competition. His procedural 
definition makes competition essential to democracy; a 
defining characteristic of democracy.
Yet Schumpeter does not say much about competition 
itself. He acknowledges that 'our theory it is of 
course no more definite than it is the concept of 
competition for leadership' 9 . Neither does he 
formally define the socially desirable by-product of 
politico-electoral competition. The by-product seems 
to be the peaceful selection of the ruling elites; 
their submission at fixed intervals to the renewal of 
the mandate; in short, the institutionalisation of 




























































































between the ideal case of perfect competition, which 
does not exist, and the real cases in which any 
electoral contestation of the ruling elite is 
prevented by force, a whole series of variations 
exists . Within this range, the democratic method of 
government fades by 'imperceptible steps' into the 
authoritarian method 10 . However, he does not specify 
what makes for this variation. Competition, therefore, 
is essentially conceived as electoral 
'contestability', that is, as openness of the 
electoral race to challengers. Schumpeter's explicit 
affirmation concerning the unintended (by the actors)
'social value' of politico-electoral competition stops 
here: the repeated selection process of the leadership 
and to its approval by the people.
Downs pushes further Schumpeter's thesis and builds on 
it explicitly recognising the inspiration 11 . 
Competition ' is a mechanism whereby political parties 
which are engaged in what Schumpeter called a 
'competitive struggle for the people's vote' are 
obliged to take account of the preference of the 




























































































The unintended social value of competition is 
*
’responsiveness'. One does not need to assume that 
candidates and parties want to respond to voters' 
preferences. They are involuntarily forced to do so 
while pursuing their goals of power by maximising the 
necessary vote. Competition obliges elites to take 
into account the preferences of voters. The thesis is 
about how competition compel the transformation of 
each party's motives into the social value of each 
party's honesty, responsibility and responsiveness to 
electors’ desires 13 .
This difference between Schumpeter and Downs is not a 
minor one. Downs' model reaches this conclusion on the 
basis of well known assumptions. His voter is a 
rational actor whose choice depends on the comparative 
evaluation of the advantages he/she expects from the 
governmental performance of different parties. He/she 
will offer his/her vote to the party which proposes 
that set of public policies which comparatively offers 
the highest return in terms of well-being as 
subjectively evaluated by the voter. Similarly, the 




























































































policies which they perceive will maximise their 
votes. In the pages where Schumpeter develops his 
concept of competitive struggle for votes, references 
to responsiveness are absent. Schumpeter does not say 
that voters know what they want and are able to 
evaluate what it is done. Consequently, he does not 
dare to conclude that elites will give them what they 
want. The kind of policies that are offered does not 
concern him very much. On the contrary, one can find 
in the text several statements that underline the 
crucial importance of the selection process: ' .. [we]
...make the deciding of issues by the electorate 
secondary to the election of the men who are to do the 
deciding'; 'Its choice [of the voter] does not flow 
from his initiative, but is being turn shaped, and the 
shaping is an essential part of the democratic 
process'; 'Voters confine themselves to accepting this 
bid in preference to others or refusing to accept it'1 
14 . One could probably say that Schumpeter's vision 





























































































With Downs, on the contrary the concept of 
'responsiveness' to the voter preferences is the 
essence of the unintended social value of electoral 
competition. Both what it is offered by
parties/candidates and the actual basis on which the 
voters judge are not only relevant, but essential to 
the achievement of the unintended social result of 
competition. While for Schumpeter 'procedural
democracy', which isauthenticated in fair electoral 
competition, offers goods that are independent from 
the substantive preferences of the voters and the 
substantive offers of the parties, Downsholds that 
through competition, procedural democracy transforms 
itself ipso facto into the only possible substantial 
democracy; a democracy which responds to voter 
preferences. Schumpeter's goals could be achieved 
even in the face of ' irrational ' , uninformed or even 
foolish or random voting. For Downs, these kind of 
voters do not force elites to involuntarily respond. 
Schumpeter's version of the competitive struggle for 
the vote is even compatible with a strong elitist 
vision whereby voter perceptions and preferences are 




























































































elites. Downs' version is not. Schumpeter emphasises 
the periodic submission of elites to an otherwise 
unspecified voter judgement. Downs stresses the 
capacity of elites to respond readily and 
sympathetically to demands. Thus, government 'approved 
by' the people it is not to the same thing as 
government 'responsive to' the people.
An objection to this emphasis on the different 
unintended social value of competition in Schumpeter 
and Downs is that the latter only brought to the 
logical final consequence a line of reasoning already 
implicit in Schumpeter's premises. However, there is 
sufficient evidence in Capitalism, Socialism and 
Democracy to demonstrate Schumpeter's mistrust of any 
substantive link between what people want and what 
elites offer in the form of a typical dyadic exchange. 
He was simply unwilling to accept the idea.
The conditions of competition
The definition of the unintended social value 
achieved through the 'technique' of individual 




























































































Different 'social values’ imply different conditions 
of attainment. If the value is the periodic
accountability of governing elites, this can be
guaranteed by procedural rules governing the holding 
of periodic elections and the possibility for several 
political actors to contest them. The only necessary 
condition to this end is contestability, that is the 
actual possibility for different political leaders and 
groups to contest free and fair elections.
Unquestionably contestability is a condition of
competition, but at the same time, contestability is 
also a basic defining characteristic of democracy; the 
one which makes political pluralism possible.
Contestability, therefore, is the point where
democracy and competition overlap. There are however, 
other often cited conditions -of democracy which are 
not necessary conditions of competition 16 . At the 
same time, there are other conditions of competition 
which need not to be regarded as conditions of 
democracy 17 .
In brief, I will argue that there are three other 




























































































responsiveness is the goal aimed at. They can be 
identified working backward from responsiveness 
What is the key to responsiveness in competitive 
races? Excluding as irrelevant individual motivations, 
the standard argument is that leaders in striving to 
keep or acquire power and office will be constantly 
worried about how voters are going to react to their 
actions. This worry is necessarily a function of the 
extent to which the leader is him/herself exposed to a 
reasonable threat of electoral sanction. Only if 
he/she will is worried about the reactions of voters 
will he/she be 'constantly piloted by the anticipation 
of those reactions' 18 . Responsiveness is achieved by 
introducing Friedrich's mechanism of anticipated 
reactions 19 . It follows that a key condition of
competition is the electoral vulnerability of
incumbents.
In turn, what are the necessary condition of 
incumbents’ vulnerability? The condition is that 
voters are willing to punish and reward; that is, they 
are available to modify their electoral choice. If 




























































































unthinkable. One does not need to postulate full 
elasticity of the vote, but some predisposition to 
electoral switch must be present if vulnerability is 
to be conceivable. The quota that is necessary, that 
is to say, the type and number of voters, is 
impossible to say at this stage. What matters is that 
such electoral availability will change from one 
context to another and in time.Therefore this 
condition will be called electoral availability 20 .
If responsiveness depends on vulnerability, and the 
latter requires voters' availability, what motivates 
the available voter to act for or against the 
incumbent government? This must be the differentiation 
of the offer and the conseuqent perception of 
different potential outcomes. Whatever 
parties/candidates offer (programmes, policies, 
ideologies, images, etc.) it must be different and 
clearly 'spelled out' for the voters, in order to make 
vulnerability not just the chance outcome of random 
change in voting habits. The anticipated reactions of 
both government and opposition parties (which are 




























































































to voters’ responses to differentiated and clear 
offers. The latter enable the voter to decide whether 
to change his/her electoral preference, and also make 
intelligible to the elites the reactions of the 
voters. If products are not differentiated (or their 
difference is not perceived), voters can punish or 
reward but no responsiveness will be achieved. I have 
argued that this is not a problem in a Schumpeterian 
perspective, where the approval of rulers is the 
essential aspect and ultimate goal. But it is crucial 
to the Downsian responsiveness perspective. Offers 
must therefore be decidable by voters in order to make 
the entire process intelligible to both voters and 
elites alike. I will call this condition the 
decidability of the offer 21 .
The argument thus far, has been the following. If 1) 
we admit that electoral competition is legitimised by 
a by-product valuable to third-part; if 2) we go 
beyond Shumpeter's minimal goal and accept 
responsiveness as the yardstick of competition 

































































































In the subsequent sections each of these conditions 
will be discussed in more detail.
Contestability
Contestability is a necessary condition of both 
democracy and competition. Conceptually, this overlap 
is ill-starred. It generates a great deal of 
confusion with the result that sometimes competition 
is equated with democracy and vice versa. In one of 
the few articles explicitly devoted to this topic, 
Roberto D'Alimonte has argued the case for an orderly 
distinction between the two processes insisting that 
'democracy is a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition of competition' and that 'competition is 
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of 
democracy' . The logical corollary is that there can 
be democracy without competition, but not competition 
without democracy. Competition does not derive solely 




























































































competition. D ’Alimonte argues that the condition of 
freedom for parties to present candidates and 
programmes and the condition of freedom for electors 
to chose them 'identify democracy not with 
competition, but with an open politico-electoral 
market in which the freedom of access is guaranteed 
both on the demand side (the electors) and on the 
supply side (the parties)' 22 . Logically therefore, if 
the politico-electoral market is open, it need not 
necessarily be competitive. The conditions of 
democracy are not the conditions of competition.
In other words, D'Alimonte clearly separates 
democracy and competition making contestability a 
property that defines an open electoral market (that 
is democracy), not a competitive market (that is 
competition). However, this line of thinking entails a 
significant drawback. Considering contestability as a 
property of democracy, means that all democracies 
should present this feature. Hence, the possibility of 
regarding different democracies as having dissimlar 
degrees of contestability is curtailed. If democracies 




























































































degree of openness? Primarily, the answer is no. I 
want to keep, within the general concept of 
competition, a dimension which indicates exactly the 
extent of openness to contestation of the electoral 
and political race. There are different political 
systems or circumstances whose democratic nature is 
undeniable, but which offer to new and old claimants 
very different opportunities for electoral 
contestation .
The usual association of condition of free entry with 
the idea of the market, and the frequent use of the 
term 'political' or 'electoral market' is somewhat 
equivocal. If we take seriously the economic 
terminology, the market is defined as an institution 
for the consumption of transactions. A market best 
performs this function when every buyer who is willing 
to pay more than the minimum realised price for any 
class of commodity succeeds in buying the commodity, 
and every seller who is willing to sell at lower price 
than the minimum realised price succeeds in selling 
the commodity . In other words, a market exist when 




























































































good, and those who are willing to charge less find 
the appropriate buyer. A market it is not defined by 
ease of entry, but by the ’ obtainability' of 
transactions. In this sense a political market 
condenses both electoral contestability and electoral 
availability. It is questionable whether this concept 
is of any use in politics. We should we ready to 
profoundly revise our categories. For instance, 
abstentionism becomes the most obvious sign of market 
failure; the existence of voters unable to find the 
desired good. At the same time, an electoral market 
exists when parties offer the same policy package at 
lower prices (taxation?), and when voters intensely 
motivated by a particular policy obtain it by 'paying 
more' (voting twice or what else?).
A further shortcoming in the concept of the 'electoral 
market' when associated with that of the economic 
market, is that market and competition are not only 
different things; they can have little to do with each 
other. A market can perform efficiently as an 
institution for the consumption of transactions and 




























































































other hand, the market can be highly imperfect in its 
performance and competitive at the same time 23 . When 
contestability is analysed in connection with 
political competition, the key operative issue is: 
given certain conditions how many actors do we need or 
can we afford to make competition lively and viable? 
The economic theory of competition in more than a 
century of reflection 24 , has given no definite, 
straighforward answer to the question of how many 
firms are necessary to make a market competitive, and 
of what maximum share of the market control by one 
firm is compatible with competition. The solution 
offered is the definition of the conditions of 
'perfect competition’, refined over time . However, to 
say that there must be numerous traders on both sides 
of the market does not identify the minimal number 
necessary to define a competitive market. Moreover, 
the indicators usually utilised to empirically 
evaluate the degree of competition are extraordinarily 
ambiguous. Two examples : concentration ratios are 
used, arguing that the lower the concentration the 
more competitive the market, but again the minimum 




























































































competition is not determined; price homogeneity is 
often regarded as an indicator of competition (the 
more prices are homogeneous the more perfect the 
competition), but the same indicator is often 
considered by Courts as a phenomenon more suggestive 
of collusion than of competition 25 . Indeed the high 
abstraction of the concept of perfect competition and 
its difficult operationalisation have pushed 
economists to look for a more realistic and 'workable' 
concept of competition 26 .
In conclusion, although economists tend to equate 
competition with openness of the market, they do not 
offer a useful solution to the problem of 
contestability in politics. The fact of the matter is 
that the question of entry is far more important in 
politics than in economics. It is somewhat paradoxical 
that economic metaphors are employed to conceptualise 
it. In politics, one can easily define in terms of 
contestability the point where competition ends and it 
is substituted by something else. At the other end of 
the spectrum, we know that a high fragmentation of the 




























































































but rather political chaos. Authority being a public 
good , success in the competition race offers 
authority not just over one's own supporters, but over 
all members of the polity. The indivisible nature of 
authority leads to strong pushes toward oligarchic 
tendencies and determines large economies of scale. 
Competition for private goods allows everyone to deal 
with the preferred partner, even though this partner 
is a very minor one. In politics, there is room for 
only a limited number of parties. New entries are 
immensely more difficult than in business. It is 
difficult to carve out a small niche in politics. 
Besides, small niches may be of very little use. 
Finally oligarchic tendencies and economies of scale 
are also fostered by the protection against foreign or 
international competition which is typical, thus far, 
of political competition.
This can make the comparative empirical study of 
political contestability possible and even easier than 
in economics. Our question should not be what is the 
'perfect' but rather what is the 'viable' level of 




























































































structure of opportunity to contest are institutional 
and linked to variables like the electoral formula, 
the requirements for candidature of individuals and 
lists, the threshold for access to public finance and 
media coverage, the cost of campaigning in different 
circumstances, but also to several other factors not 
strictly institutional. It is therefore better 1) to 
keep contestability as an important dimension of 
competiiton. As will be clear later, the level of 
contestability impinges upon other conditions of 
competiiton; 2) to keep contestability clearly 
separate from electorate availability, thus avoiding 
to condensate both of therm in the 'open market’ 
metaphor; 3) to consider contestability as a structure 
of political opportunity; and 4) to concentrate on the 
empirical factors which may impinge upon the 
variations in this structure of opportunities for new 
and old potential claimants.
Availability
In Downs, the rational orientation toward the policies 
or policy packages offered by parties makes the voter 




























































































available to change partisan preference should a 
better offer be made to him 27 . For electoral 
competition it is essential that at least a quota of 
the electorate be available to such change. Such a 
quota represents what is at stake in the rivalry; the
prize of the parallel efforts by competitors ;
therefore, the incentive for party competition.
Without available voters, it is unlikely that parties
would be willing to engage in policy competition.
We do not have precise information about the quota of 
available electorate necessary to make an electoral 
contest competitive or more competitive than another. 
The literature on electoral behaviour has accumulated 
a vast amount of material that indicates the extent to 
which individual voters and electorates are, in fact, 
little inclined to respond to changes of the offer 
with changes in party choice. Strong psychological 
identifications, resulting from organisational 
encapsulation, cultural bonds, and the like make 
important quotas of the national electorates 
unavailable for voting switches. Thus, the actual 




























































































or country is an empirical aspect of crucial 
importance for the study of electoral competition. It 
is probably true that electoral behaviour studies have 
not payed sufficient attention to the topic of 
electoral availability in relation to the issue of the 
competitive nature of elections. We may simply assume 
that, ceteris paribus, the higher the level of 
potential availability, the higher the potential level 
of competition. However, the problem is complicated by 
the fact that the quantity of the available vote may 
be less important than its location.
At this juncture, it is important to underscore that 
the 'available voter' - defined as that voter who is 
willing to consider modifying his/her party choice - 
is not the same as the 'opinion voter', the 'informed 
voter' or, worse, the 'rational voter'. The 'available 
voter' it is not necessarily informed about issues or 
programmes, but is sensitive to them 28 . 
Sensitiveness neither entails strong information, nor 
capacity of judgement; it simply refers to the 
availability to be influenced when choosing, by 




























































































experience. A switcher can be highly uninformed and 
uninterested, as much as a strong identifier or a true 
believer can be politically competent and interested. 
What is certain, however, is that 1) identifiers have 
a lower propensity to switch than sensitive voters; 2) 
voters' sensitivity is higher a) the lower the number 
of cleavage lines activated or mobilised 
(segmentation); b) the less the organisational 
encapsulation of the electorate; c)the more diffuse 
the network of groups and the less interlocking is the 
link between specific political organisations 
(parties) and corporate groups outside the electoral 
domain; 3) parties, if compelled, look for switchers 
irrespective of who they are.
Aggregate measures of electoral volatility (party 
volatility as well as block of parties or system total 
volatility 29 ) are used to characterise the volatility 
of different electorates at different points in time. 
Their importance should not be underestimated, 
notwithstanding their obvious limitations in the 
cancelling out of voting shifts of different signs 




























































































aggregate volatilities are by and large the only thing 
party leaders perceive of the potential electoral 
availability in their system. They are also the only 
certain element which enables them to ascertain the 
electorate's reactions to their strategic choices and 
moves. Individual level volatility has also been 
studied through transition matrices of voting switches 
giving a more precise estimation of the amount of 
electors who actually change their mind from one 
election to the next 30 . Unfortunately, these studies 
are not numerous and this kind of information is not 
collected routinely for elections. Moreover, their 
utilisation for the characterisation of the available 
electorate as the prize of the competitive efforts by 
the parties/candidates, is rare.
A further problem is that, whether aggregated or 
individual, these measures refer to actual voting 
shifts. But electoral availability is poorly measured 
by actual voting shifts. An elector can be 'at stake' 
in the sense of being available to change her/his 
partisan choice even if in the end he/she will record 




























































































actual voting changes underestimates electoral 
availability, as it records only those available 
electors who actually switched their preference, 
leaving aside those who did not. In the global 
electorate, aggregate volatility underestimates 
individual voting shifts, and the latter underestimate 
the actual electoral availability, as represented in 
Figure 1.





In a recent article, Eijk and Oppenhuis have suggested 
ways to operationalise electoral availability at the 
individual levels which are very promising as they are 




























































































electoral competition. They do not use the term 
availability or available electorate but they pick up 
this dimension with survey data in which people are 
asked about their willingness to vote for parties 
other than the one they prefer 31 . People are ranked 
according to the probability of voting for each of the 
parties in their party system. Voters range from those 
who are likely to vote for only one party to those who 
are likely to vote for several different parties. This 
method allows the differentiation of both different 
electorates and different sections of the same 
electorate, according to their electoral availability 
, although the authors tend to dichotomise their 
result in terms of electors ' beyond' competition and 
electors 'subject to intense competition' (pp. 60-61). 
Of great interest is their application of the data to 
individual parties. Through a number of operational 
choice, of no concern in this discussion, they compare 
the available vote for a party (those electors who 
declare it to be a possible choice) with the actual 
vote the party eventually gets at the polls. The term 




























































































parties’ and it measures the relationship between the 
potential and the actual vote collected by the party.
The merit of this approach is not only that it 
suggests a direction to properly operationalise the 
dimension of electoral availability, but also that it 
relates this aspect to the patterns of electoral 
competition. Eijk and Oppenhuis tend to equate 
electoral availability with electoral competition, 
leaving aside what I consider to be other important 
condition of electoral competition. This is however, a 
minor point. They demonstrate that it is possible not 
only to properly conceptualise, but also to come to 
comparative inter-party and inter-system comparisons 
of electoral availability, seen as a necessary (but 
not sufficient) condition of electoral competition.
Decidability
Given the existence of electoral contestability and 
electoral availabiltiy, what happens if the parties do 
not want to compete? Are there conditions which push 
parties to limit or to avoid altogether the 




























































































versions of the competitive theory of democracy and, 
in particular, formal models of party competition 
refer to the fact that parties offer programmes, 
policies, ideologies, images, issues or whatever else, 
not much is said about the decidability quality of 
these offers necessary to guarantee, improve, maximise 
or otherwise substantiate electoral competition. Is 
the quality of the offer so unimportant for electoral 
competition?
In formal models of voting choice an important role is 
given to what I define here as decidability. The net 
utility of the victory of the voter's preferred 
candidate's in Downs 32 , or the differential benefits 
of outcomes (the party differential), in W. H. Riker 
and P. C. Ordeshook's 'calculus of voting' 33 
indicate how the voter perceives the difference it 
will make for her/him if party or candidate X or Y is 
elected. This obviously depends on product 
differentiation. If products are undifferentiated this 
term is zero and the probability of affecting the 
outcome (which I will discuss in the next section as 




























































































differentials count, but in formal models of 
competition they are reduced to party distances in a 
space either chosen as an example, or postulated or 
drawn from some data set.
For party competition to produce leadership 
responsiveness, the decidability of what is offered to 
voters is a necessary condition. The notion of choice 
is essential. Voters must perceive differences between 
parties/candidates in terms of emphasis, priority or 
performance in order to make a choice. Therefore, 
whatever the party offers, it must be 1) different 
from what others offer and 2) clearly perceived by 
voters. Policy or issue position differentiation among 
parties, visibility and clarity of these differences 
for the voter are what I call here decidability.
There are several reasons why little attention is 
paid to the decidability of the offer in theories of 
competition. Firstly, the decidability of the offer it 
is not regarded as essential, as the emphasis is on 
the competitive selection of political personnel. I 




























































































Schumpeter's position. Secondly, economic analysis 
from which political analogies are drawn, does not 
attribute much importance to this aspect. Quite the 
contrary, in a perfect competition model, goods should 
be as homogeneous as possible. The third and more 
important reason in my opinion, is that somehow the 
decidability of the offer is implicitly - not 
explicitly - postulated. The differentiation of 
products offered is assumed to result from other 
features of the competitive process.
Rational choice theorists consider voter' preferences 
as 'intrinsic', that is, as 'exogenous to the process 
of party competition' 34 . This means that voters have 
preferences which are independent from the offer made 
by politicians and parties. Obviously this is a 
crucial assumption, as one could well imagine that 
voter preferences are shaped to a greater or lesser 
extent by the process of party competition and are in 
no way exogenous to it. Formal theorists, whether or 
not they discuss this issue, come to the conclusion 
that preferences are exogenous 35 . The second 




























































































of political competition is that they are stable 
during the process of competition itself. Combining 
the endogenous versus exogenous shaping of voter' 
preferences, with their stability or change during the 
process of electoral competition, one can draw the 
following scheme:
See Table 1 at page 86
Clearly, a structure of preferences that is 
endogenously produced throughout the process of 
competition can not be stable and therefore this type 
is impossible 36 . Of the remaining three types that 
normally postulated by economic models of competition 
is Type I. By definition, the structure of preference 
is exogenous, and, in the short run, such a structure 
is also stable. That is, it is not even affacted by 
forces outside the competition process itself.
What form does party competition takes under these 




























































































is acquire information about the stable and 
exogenously determined structure of preferences and 
try to adapt to it. They also need to engage in 
advertising campaigns, trying to inform the public of 
their stances. That is all. Party strategy is only an 
adaptive effort. Whatever complicating factors are 
added (activists attitudes, organisational features, 
etc.), will only make the achievement of this pre­
defined adaptation more or less easy and efficient .
Type II is a variation of the theme. Keeping the 
exogenous formation of the structure of preferences, 
the simplification of the stable structure can be 
abandoned. Preferences can be modified even in the 
short term, but these modifications will be the result 
of factors external to party competition! cultural and 
value changes? Socio-structural modifications? Media 
coverage of events? It is not necessary to identify 
precisely the sources of change, but it is important 
to stress that in any case they are exogenous to the 




























































































case are just adaptive machines. They either can or 
cannot see the changes and the potential gains or 
losses associated with them, but they can neither 
influence them, nor how voters perceive them. 
Electoral competition is ethero-directed.
I do not want to discuss the realism or the 
consequences of the assumption of the exogenous 
formation of preferences. What interests me is that in 
this static perspective, the decidability problem 
becomes marginal by definitional fiat. If they cannot 
shape preferences, parties must adapt to them. Their 
offers are meant to meet autonomously formed 
preferences. If the offer is, for instance, not very 
decidable - that is, undifferentiated and unclear 
party stands predominate - this can only be the
result of preferences. If preferences can not be 
influenced what other strategy can parties adopt? How 
can they, for instance, collude if their collusion 
does not modify the preferences of voters? How can 
they follow an alternative strategy of maximum 
decidability? The only basis on which they can decide 




























































































the given preferences. Any other solution will only 
expose them to totally unproductive risks. Once the 
preferences are made unmodifiable, the offer becomes 
but a function of such preferences. In this sense, I 
believe that the assumption of the exogenous nature of 
preferences implicitly contributes to the rendering 
irrelevant of the problem of the decidability of the 
offer.
Let's consider the situation in Type III. The picture 
changes: the structure of electoral preferences is not 
exogenous to party competition but is influenced, if 
not determined, by it. Parties and politicians believe 
they can influence the preference of electors. This 
implies that they can do something other than adapt; 
to get the electors on their side 37 . Adaptation to 
the structure of preferences and modification of the
structure of preferences interplay; begetting
different mix of adaptation and modification, and
debate about the degree of adaptation and
modification.
The structure of electoral preferences is changing and 




























































































parties and politicians do; depend on the offer. Party 
competition here is identified as the process through 
which parties and elites try to shape and modify to 
their advantage the structure of the electoral 
preferences. That is, exactly the contrary of what is 
postulated by rational choice theory. The way the 
electoral preferences are structured is not irrelevant 
to party competition, but is the object, essence and 
core of party competition itself. It is in the context 
of a 'preference shaping' type of competition that 
decidability becomes crucial.
Once decidability is regarded as a necessary condition 
for competition, deliberate strategies of increasing 
offer differentiation or of blurring party stances 
enter into empirical study. We must proceed from the 
recognition that political competition is built on a 
number of strong confining conditions of product 
differentiation. We can identify three processes of 
competition avoidance or restraint on the offer side:
1) those situations in which the very interest or 




























































































structure which strongly limits or even prohibits 
certain offers to be made;
2) those situations in which the interest and purpose 
of the suppliers are accessible to competition 
practices and competition as such is not limited, but 
the means through which it is pursued are more or less 
restricted;
3) those situations in which the interest and purpose 
of the suppliers are accessible to competition 
practices but competition is limited in its scope as a 
result of sheer collusion practices which supersede 
competition itself.
The first case concerns the socio-political capsule of 
competition. The set of norms, social practices and 
legal provisions which define the conditions of 
competition are normally protected from the basic 
principle of chance which operates in competition. The 
very interest and purpose of the group identify themes 
in which electoral competition, in terms of 
differentiated offers, is highly limited, as in the 




























































































solidarity, and more generally sets of formal and 
informal constitutional rules.
The second case is that of the restriction of the 
means through which competition obtains. The principle 
which supersedes competition is often that of the 
mechanical equality of the parts 38 . For instance, 
equality of competitive means is often invoked and 
aimed at by agreement on sharing equal access to 
television broadcasting, equal attention in written 
media, proportional access to public resources for 
electoral competition, or ceilings of the total amount 
of resources candidates and parties can invest in 
political advertising. Even the proper style of 
campaigning and political advertising may be the 
object of inter-individual (that is voluntarily
reached) or super-individual (imposed by law or 
morality standards) limitations. The interesting
question is whether the restriction of certain 
competitive means actually affects the substance of 
policy and issue competition. Certain restrictions do 
not limit competition, but, on the contrary, they 




























































































unnecessary elements. Preventing the diversion of 
competition from diminishing the capacity of 
competitors, these restrictions can force competition 
to concentrate on the offer itself. It is therefore 
possible for competitors to establish agreements in a 
specific area of competition without weakening it in 
other areas. These inter-individual restrictions may 
grow to free competition from all those things which 
do not constitute competition, because in principle 
they can cancel each other out without effect. As shop 
keepers can agree on fixed opening hours or sale 
periods, so political actors can agree on the muting 
or soft pedalling of certain means and techniques of 
competition. Yet, one should not forget that the means 
of competition consist, in some cases, of advantages 
offered to the third part, which may bear the brunt of 
the excessive restrictions on such means. These 
agreements can, in extreme cases, affect the very 
essence of competition, that is, to bring about forms 
of collusion and cartellisation that become plans for 





























































































This is in fact, the third form of restriction on 
competition which is the most important in this 
context. What is actually restricted is the scope of 
the offer in fields in principle accessible to 
political competition. The amount of forces and 
situations which lead to collusion and cartellisation 
practices among political competitors could scarcely 
be underestimated. First of all, politics is 
inherently collusive as a consequence of the 
exclusiveness of authority. The high threshold for 
access to authority requires a high degree of 
concentration of the market. The great deal of 
necessary coalition politics, j. s , in essence, 
cartellisation practice. In the processes of coalition 
making (electoral, parliamentary or governmental), 
policy positions, issues etc. are compromised, diluted 
or simply totally muted so a s .to obtain the economy 
of scale which is sought for. Coalition politics may 
indeed maximise other necessary conditions of 
competition (see below), but unquestionably they bring 





























































































The multiplicity of the sites of party interaction is 
a second incentive to collusion. Contrary to economic 
competition, political competition takes place in 
different and yet inter-linked sites or arenas. 
Parties compete in the electoral arena, but they then 
(as before) continue their interaction in other arenas 
like the legislative-parliamentary one and the 
governmental one. The same party may take different 
policy positions in the various arenas. Legislators 
group or regroup in different ways than they do at 
election time. The decidability of issues and policies 
may be voluntarily limited by the interplay of the 
electoral, legislative and governmental party systems. 
Opportunities to boost the salience of issues 
exploitable in the electoral arena, and which may 
concern sizeable sectors of public opinion, may not be 
taken up or may be dampened because they are damaging 
in other arenas; in light, for instance, of the 
potential consequences for the successive legislative 
bargaining. Possibilities in the legislative or 
governmental arena may be left unexplored because of 
the reluctance to expose oneself to the risk of an 




























































































terms. It is possible to defeat an incumbent 
government with alliances and tactical moves which, 
however, may be detrimental in the electoral channel 
if obliged to fight an election in those terms 39 .
In other words, the necessary interplay between 
electoral competition and legislative bargaining may 
lead to the downplay of those issues regarded as 
favourable in one arena but possibly damaging in 
another
40
Finally, collusion and cartellisation may be achieved 
through co-ordinated manipulation of issue saliency. 
Analytically, they can be classified as follows:
1) blurred and unclear party position or party policy 
on certain issues;
2) slow transformation of certain problems from clear 
partisan to valence issue;
3) transfer of certain issue from the domain of 
politically legitimised decision making to domains 




























































































The discussion of these situations will require far 
more space than that available in this paper. I limit 
the argument to a few points. The transformation of 
divisive issues in valence issues is a process which 
weakens decidability. Position issues are 'those that 
involve advocacy of government actions from a set of 
alternatives over which a distribution of voter 
preferences is defined. And ... ’valence' issues 
[are] those that merely involve the linking of the 
parties with some condition that is positively or 
negatively valued by the electorate' 41 . Position
issues are inherently divisive as they involve 
explicit for or against choices. Valence issues, on 
the contrary entail only one value (positive or 
negative) that is shared by the vast majority and they 
are essentially non-divisive 42 .
In an article devoted to the style of competition, 
Schneider proposes the following typology of issues
which combines the clarity of the party stance
dimension with that of the more or less divisive




























































































See Table 2 at page 87
The dimension of party choice, clear/non-clear,
concerns whether the voter perceives a difference 
between the parties on a particular problem. This 
dimension, which
Schneider calls 'quality of choice' 44 , can be
measured by voter ability to discriminate party 
positions and consequently, voter shifts correlated 
with issue positions. The 'divisiveness' dimension 
points to issues being defined more as position or 
more as valence. The two together refer to the 
decidability of the offer.
Since position issues are divisive, by definition the 





























































































For 'valence issues' the question is more complex. A 
'choice' in position terms is simply the anticipation 
that one solution is better than the other, and that, 
therefore, it makes sense to change or not to change •
In the case of valence issues, choice essentially 
comes down to the question of whether one party can do 
better than the other that which is defined as a 
matter of general and agreed concern. The choice of 
specific remedies and policies is less defined, being 
overshadowed by quartions of 'competence'. When a 
general solution is desired by the vast majority, the 
specific remedy is less in the forefront than is the 
general perception of the non incumbents to do better 
than the incumbents. 'The failure of choice would be 
evidenced by the widespread perception that no 
alternative government will work. The decision to vote 
one way or the other could mean little in terms of 
anticipated performance' 45 .
From the point of view of what I regard as the 
decidability of the offer, divisive issues on which 




























































































the most decidable. Valence issues with a clear 
partisan orientation (election issue) may still be 
decidable. A valence issue is not divisive, but this 
does not imply that it is not controversial. Its 
salience, to whom is blame attributed, whether voters 
perceive a difference between parties in terms of 
priorities and performance, makes for its more or less 
controversial and debatable nature. The level of 
decidability seems to decline progressively when party 
stances are unclear and it is at its lowest when, at 
the same time, issues are not divisive. If parties can 
shape preferences through competition, they will tend 
to do so by defining issues as more or less divisive 
and by making their stances more or less well defined. 
That is by manipulating decidability.
Sheer removal of issue from the agenda is a more 
complicated but not infrequent solution. Issues and 
policy offer may be removed by 'constitutionalising' 
them or by referring them to other domains of 
legitimation of decision making. By 
1constitutionalisation', I mean the 




























































































be kept safely out of the policy domain regulated by 
parties. If the requirement of no public deficit (or 
of a maximum public deficit), or the prohibition of 
sending armed forced outside the national territory 
are constitutionalised, then the issue is to a large 
extent removed from public debate, and the need for 
parties and candidates to take clear stands is reduced 
correspondingly. Alternatively, issues and policies 
can be transferred to domains where legitimation 
principles other than political exist. Issues may be 
pre-defined and left to the decisions of bodies where 
competence is the key resource: defending the value of 
the currency can be defined as an institutional goal 
and thus made the preserve of central bank 
authorities; controlling the political fairness of the 
mass media can be devolved to bodies and authorities 
on the basis of the same principle. Issues and 
policies may also be pre-defined and pre-decided by 
internationally accepted or imposed priorities and 
goals (EEC decisions; IMF requirements, GATT 
agreements, etc.) which may be used by political 
parties as a defence against taking clear political 




























































































policies can be left to the actors who control the 
resources for their implementation 46 ; to forms of 
'negotiated order' in which key economic actors agree 
to regulate macro-economic policies of interest to the 
parts 47 . Whether the principle invoked is efficiency, 
competence, or resource control the actual result may 
be an important muting of party differentials in key 
domains. The amount of policies which are 'pre­
defined' and ' pre-decided1 in this way may be large 
and varies from country to country as well as over 
time.
This long list of potential sources of collusive 
behaviour on the part of political competitors for 
votes is not meant to 'denounce' or otherwise 'fault' 
these practices, but simply to bring attention to the 
point that their diffusion is a crucial empirical 
dimension in the study of the conditions of 
competitive politics 48 . However, there are barriers 
and obstacles to political cartellisation and 
collusion. The first is imperfect knowledge of the 
consequences of rivalry and of the profit of 




























































































parties/candidates are uncertain as to the profit of 
this strategy as opposed to an adversarial competitive 
strategy. The second obstacle is the difficulty of 
determining the division of profits among colluders. 
Parties may be in disagreement and/or scared of the 
potential disagreement over how the advantages of 
collusion should be then distributed. In the first 
case uncertainty concerns the unforeseen potential 
reactions of the voters. In the second case
uncertainty concerns the divisions of the advantages 
among the actors. In both cases, the result is rather 
unstable choices between more co-operative and more 
competitive relationships in the struggle for the 
vote.
It goes without saying that the investigation of the 
dimension of decidability is removed by fiat if the 
structure of preferences is taken as exogenous to 
party competition. In empirical reserach, it is 
impossible to postulate or take for granted
competition on the offer side. Laying too much 
emphasis on competition, we may easily forget that 




























































































classes' have much in common at stake to defend, that 
political elites can easily agree to share a value 
through the voluntarily equalisation of effort rather 
than fighting for it , that competition on the offer 
side is not a natural outcome and requires special 
conditions in order to flourish. Continous efforts are 
made to avoid it and therefore, continuos costs are 
met in order to preserve it 49 . Paraphrasing Gaetano 
Mosca's famous point about military rule, the real 
question it is not why parties sometimes collude, but 
why they do not do so all the time.
Vulnerability
In economic life and theory, the existence of a given 
product does not preclude the existence of a different 
one that can be chosen instead. The products offered 
in a more or less decidable way to voters are mutually 
exclusive. Given the coercive nature of politics, if a 
policy is implemented a different policy cannot be 
implemented at the same time. There cannot be two 





























































































The exclusivity of policy and legislation rests on 
the exclusivity of government. There is a threshold 
for gaining the right to coerce
In economic life, a firm which sells 49% of a product 
is not a failure. In politics it may well be.
This basic difference is not often discussed in 
articles which focus on economic and political 
competition 50 . Vulnerability, originates from and is 
meaningful only in relation to the exclusivity of 
political authority. For this condition of 
competition, no analogy with the market and economic 
competition seems possible.
It is not necessary to discuss this problem at length 
as a rich literature already exists. Vulnerability may 
be defined as the possibility for an incumbent 
government to be ousted and replaced or otherwise 
modified in its composition as a result of changes in 




























































































has two psychological effects: 1) parties perceive 
the chance of gaining or loosing the exclusive good of 
public authority; 2) voters perceive an increase in 
the potential impact of their vote on the final 
outcome of governmental formation and/or renovation.
In the American context, there has been a great deal 
of post-war studies concerning this particular 
dimension of competition. The reference point of these 
studies was of course the American two party system, 
where it was easier to collapse several conditions of 
competition into the single one of vulnerability. 
Therefore, vulnerability is regarded as being 
basically the same thing as competition, although the 
phenomenon was given different names. The names range 
from 'closeness of the electoral outcome' to 
'uncertainty of the electoral result'; from 
'performance sensitivity' to 'decisiveness of 
elections for governmental turnover'; from 
'changeability' 51 to 'competitiveness' or 'systemic 
competition'. The term 'performance sensitivity' 
implies that the incumbent position is vulnerable as a 




























































































performance when in government. This is to say and to 
demand far too much. The basic difference between the 
other terms is that some of them tend to stress actual 
aspects of governmental turnover, while others tend to 
stress the potential turnover. Schlesinger, for
instance, positively refers his concept of
vulnerability to the 1 ) number of elections won by 
each party; and 2) the rapidity with which parties 
alternate in office. He argues that 'perhaps the 
rate of alternation is even more important in giving 
the participants a sense of competition than is the 
overall division of victories' 52 . Similarly,
'decisiveness' of elections for governmental outcome' 
or 'changeability' stress the actual result of 
competition. Insisting on actual alternation means 
that at every given moment the perception of the 
vulnerability of government is the result of past 
experiences. The obvious critique is that 
vulnerability may be present without actual turnover 
taking place or vice versa.
To stress 'closeness' of electoral returns in terms of 




























































































votes and seats 53 , or the concept of 'uncertainty' of 
electoral outcome' refers to the psychological effect
linked to the absence of safety, rather than the
actual result. Closeness and uncertainty may not
result into turnover but still provide their supposed 
effect on competition 54 . Yet, without any prior
information, how can the level of closeness or
symmetry which would guarantee vulnerability be
ascertained? What if close elections were repeated
over time with the same governmental outcome?
Both the dimension of actual past record and present 
uncertainty have to be incorporated into the idea of 
vulnerability. Some element of the objective closeness 
of electoral returns must give rise to a sense of 
unsafety for incumbents and a sense of opportunity for 
opponents, but at the same time this objective base 
can not be defined without reference to some record of 
past experience. For this reason, in the great variety 
of measures of electoral vulnerability experimented in 
the context of the federal and state level as well as 
for presidential, governors and legislative elections 




























































































measures which are expressed in the form of a ratio 
between some objective element of closeness of the 
race at a given moment and some objective element 
indicating the past competitive performance of the 
system. I regard as very interesting Stern's measure 
56 . In a given unit (local township in his case), he 
takes the vote for the majority party/candidate and 
relates it to the standard deviations of the same 
majority vote in the previous elections. If that vote 
minus two standard deviations is still over 50%, then 
the government is safe. If that vote minus two 
standard deviations is below 50% but the same vote 
minus one standard deviation is above 50% then the 
contest is classified as marginal. If that vote minus 
a standard deviation falls below 50% than government 
is competitive. In so doing, Stern's measure links the 
majoritarian advantage of the winning party to the 
past variability of this margin 57 . If one were to 
substitute the three terms 'safe', 'marginal' and 
'competitive' with the single dimension of the level 
of vulnerability, we go from a minimum vulnerability 
in the first case to the maximum in the latter. I am 




























































































measure that shares the same logic. For each given 
election, I consider the distance from the majority 
thresholds of each party/vocation/candidate. This 
distance is then related to the average aggregate 
volatility of previous elections along the incumbent 
versus non-incumbent dimension. For instance, a 10% 
margin over the 50% threshold does not give a secure 
indication of the real or perceived vulnerability of 
the incumbent unless it is related to the average 
aggregate voting switch which takes place between 
incumbents and the opposition. If that average 
aggregate voting shift is 20%, that a 10 % margin does 
not make for safety. If, on the contrary, it is only 
2%, then a 10 % majority distance makes for
considerably little vulnerability 58 . The same level 
of closeness of the votes between government and 
opposition makes government safe in a system with low 
electoral availability along the line which separate 
majority and opposition, and vulnerable in a system 
with high volatility.
There is no need to discuss at any great length this 




























































































the elements of uncertainty and unsafety associated 
with the concept of incumbents ' vulnerability are not 
fully tapped by measures of closeness or distance 
alone. Something is required which indicates the 
perception of incumbents and opponents about the 
likeliness of that distance to be matched by aggregate 
voters shifts. Symmetry of voting can be a good proxy 
for information we do not have, but strictly speaking 
it is not adequate.
Vulnerability is a system property. It refers to the 
unit of the party system. It results from specific 
configurations of the number, the strength and the 
alliance-opposition relationships among the units of 
the system without belonging to any of them. It 
presents important empirical links with other 
conditions of competition like contestability, 
availability and decidability, but it is independent 
from all of them. Only two conditions can be regarded 
as necessary for the maximisation of governmental 
vulnerability:





























































































2) an average electoral availability along the 
incumbent/opposition line large enough to approach (or 
bypass) the majority margin of incumbents.
In relation to the first condition, the visibility of 
the incumbents/opposition camps is decisively blurred 
in cases of : 1) greatly oversized majorities; 2) 
truly minority government (to the extent that they 
rest on collusion with the opposition in parliament);
3) frequent change in government composition during 
the legislature. Truly minority government poses a 
special challenge to the concept of vulnerability. 
Minority governments are vulnerable by definition as 
their survival rests on some sort of collusion with 
non-governmental parties. However, their high 
parliamentary vulnerability may result in their 
electoral invulnerability. The problem is what 
electoral (non parliamentary) mechanism would make a 
minority government vulnerable. One can imagine that 
minority governments are relatively insensitive to 
electoral returns because their raison d'être is not 
electoral. At the same time we are not prepared to go 




























































































irrelevant to them. We have to find some better 
argument than the 'non applicable' one in this case.
As far as the second condition is concerned, it is 
often argued that what matters for vulnerability is 
more the 'decisive location' of the available 
electorate than its sheer quantity (although one can 
say that the higher the quantity the higher the 
likelihood that a sufficient share of it will be 
locate so as to contribute to vulnerability). The 
'decisive location' of available voters is 
unquestionably crucial only if a spatial 
representation of politics is given. Whether a spatial 
dimension of politics exists (in the electorate), the 
amount of dimension it has and how good an instrument 
to describe concrete historical situation it is, 
remain empirical questions. Therefore, we can not make 
the 'decisive location' a necessary condition. What 
matters is 'sufficient' incumbent/opposition electoral 
availability. Spatial location can not be incorporated 
as a 'necessary' condition for vulnerability . As for 
'symmetry' (or closeness) of the vote/seats 




























































































condition, I have already argued that it is not. It 
can, perhaps, be considered a facilitating one.
The relationship among the different dimensions of 
competition
In Table 3, I have summarised the main points 
concerning the four dimensions of competition when it 
is regarded as a process leading to elite 
responsiveness to voters preferences. The four 
conditions of contestability versus closure, 
availability versus encapsulation, decidability versus 
collusion and vulnerability versus safety of tenure, 
identify dimensions which can be maximised or 
minimised. If contestability is minimised, the process 
can go so far as to endanger pluralism, which is also, 
as we said, a defining condition of democracy. Beyond 
the minimum necessary level of pluralism, 
contestability can vary, but a maximisation of 
contestability is likely to bring about excessive 
fragmentation on the offer side. When the forces of 
voter encapsulation are so strong as to lead to the 
extinction of electoral availability, then electoral 




























































































to the political offer, it is unlikely that buyers 
will be found. On the other hand, the maximisation of 
electoral availability points to a situation in which 
every voter is likely to change his/her mind. The 
consequence is an exceptional volatility from election 
to election.
See Table 3 at page 88
When decidability is brought to a minimum, party 
positions on issues and policies are blurred and 
unclear, issues tend to Elide from 'divisive' to 
'valence' or to be simply muted and/or transferred to 
another domain of decision making different from the 
electoral political channel. Consequences of collusive 
tendencies may include growing political 
dissatisfaction, voter defection and even mass 




























































































is defined in which the maximisation of decidability 
brings about very high policy differentials and a very 
adversarial style of politics. This tendency can 
result into clear ideological polarisation. Finally, 
safety of governmental tenure strongly undermines 
responsiveness. Yet, maximisation of vulnerability has 
its owns drawbacks. In the extreme case it could bring 
about a 'permanent campaign' syndrome 59 : frequent 
feedback on government popularity, on the relative 
salience of issue in the mass public, and on the 
preference of the public (even on issues not yet 
articulated by the opinion makers); more awareness by 
citizens of governmental actions or possible actions 
and better chances to react more visibly to them; 
correspondingly, governments' sense of being more 
exposed to political pressures from the general 
public; constant watching of opinion polls by 
politicians in order to evaluate the response of 
public opinion to policy options
; politicians belief in their capacity to immediatly 
estimate the costs in terms of support for specific 
decisions (far greater than the capacity to appreciate 




























































































postponement of critical and divisive decisions by 
elected officials for fear of alienating potential 
supporters.
It follows that each dimension impinges on the other 
not in a linear and additive way, but in a rather 
contradictory one. High contestability may allow high 
fragmentation. Intense minorities may find it more 
preferable to enter the electoral race than to 
articulate their demands within more encompassing 
political parties, even if motivated by single-issues 
or small range concerns . This is likely to have a
negative effect on the clear distinction between 
government and opposition, and therefore on 
vulnerability. High vulnerability may lead to low 
decidability and no differentiation of the political 
offer. 'Perfect' vulnerability is achieved when two 
parties(coalitions) of equal size compete for a few 
median voters (in theory just for the median voter). 
Unless the degree of contestability allows for 
credible third party alternatives, party willingness 
to shape clear and alternative choices to voters is 




























































































decidability, one needs a certain amount of electoral 
availability which is not functional to vulnerability. 
At the same time, excessively volatile electorates, 
resulting for declining cultural and organisational 
ties, may bring about an issue or policy ’balkanised’ 
electorate with no dimensionality whatsoever 61 . A 
certain amount of vote identification and vote 
stability is necessary to
allow parties to plan the offer, to interpret the 
reaction of the electorate, and to reduce the risks of 
collusion resulting from their failing in this 
respect.
In my view, a conspicuously attractive interaction 
takes place between decidability and vulnerability. 
Decidability requires clear alternative choices: a 
clear-cut policy or programmatic profile of candidates 
and parties (coalitions); no muting of major and 
divisive issues; no transformation of divisive issues 
in valence issue. Vulnerability rests on institutional 
solutions which avoid fragmentation (majority 
formula), and allow clear attribution of political 




























































































responsibility). It also rests on political 
conditions: no disagreement on fundamentals (avoid 
that performance evaluation be overshadowed by 
consideration of system defence); a broad electoral 
coalition open to all sectors of the population; the 
absence of polarising ideological issues; the 
bypassing of the historical divisions and the 
identities linked to them; a strong orientation of the 
vote toward performance-evaluation.
To what extent are these two sets of conditions 
mutually compatible? Is it possible to simultaneously 
maximise decidability and vulnerability? Probably not. 
A vicious circle may exists in which increasing 
responsiveness implies increasing credibility of 
sanctions for incumbents; the latter implies that 
increasingweight is given to median voter preferences 
by both governing and opposition parties; the latter 
implies the increasing non-differentiation of 
political offer, declining policy competition, 
declining decidability and, finally, reduced 
responsiveness to preferences. Certainly, sensitive 




























































































to have their preferences considered is linked to 
their chance of obtaining an alternative new party. 
Maximising competition as vulnerability in the absence 
of easy exit options will result in the widening of 
what Matthews calls the 'ideological gap’ between 
governmental positions and sections of the electorate 
62 . The need to be ' competitive ' at the governmental 
level may prevent parties from taking stands on 
controversial and divisive issues. In situations of 
high vulnerability established parties may be 
unwilling to take the risk of identifying clearly with 
policies and issues highlighting the cost to be
shared by specific groups in exchange for broadly 
collective advantages whose electoral returns are 
uncertain. In these situations, there is a strong 
incentive to define issues in suich a way that no 
opposing sides are identifiable, and to push parties 
to argue more about who is more competent or capable 
of assuring the achievement of consensually accepted 
principles, rather than arguing about which
principles should be embodied in policy. For these 
reasons, new parties emerge which concentrate on 




























































































problems. Having no traditional constituency to 
defend, they can appeal across partisan lines. 
However, if new parties are needed for taking partisan 
stands on new issues, then a decline in the 
vulnerability at the system level may well be the 
result, so that what is gained in decidability is lost 
in vulnerability of incumbents.
Some recent tendencies of electioneering 63 , with 
their stress on candidate-centric campaigning, on fund 
raising as 'primary', on heavy concentration on radio 
and television campaign, packaging of candidates by 
professional advisers, well prepared, media controlled 
public appearances, parading before carefully screened 
audiences (up to the point of reducing appearances to 
chat-shows and ’infomericals') are the correlate of 
high leadership vulnerability, but they also tend to 
deprive the public, even the most informed part of it, 
of any real choice.
There may be too much pragmatism and incrementalism, 
as has been suggested, and the bringing of 




























































































welcomed. The increasing sharpness of policy 
alternatives will provide voters with the opportunity 
of making choices between clear-cut policy sets 64 . 
But there might also be too little influence of voters 
on government and leadership selection, as others 
argue. Thus, we should welcome the bringing about of 
coalition formula, of electoral institutions, of forms 
of government, of chief executive selection which will 
provide the voter with a direct say in the selection 
of alternative government. If we call the first good 
'to have a choice' and the second ' to have a say', we 
end up with a difficult predicament: choice without 
say or say without choice.
An empirical study of competition has no way to escape 
its contradictory multi-dimensionality. This can only 
be avoided by stipulative decisions or assumptions. If 
the various conditions or dimensions of competition 
have complex relationships among themselves, this 
means that electoral competition cannot be conceived 
as a linear process going from zero or a minimum to a 
maximum, theoretically definable as 'perfect 




























































































from economics but it is not applicable in politics if 
we agree that the parallel maximisation of all 
conditions of competition is not only impossible, 
because of the afore mentioned interactive effect 
among them, but also detrimental. One can not 
therefore speak of more or less competition, but 
rather of a different mix of contestability, 
availability, decidability and vulnerability, without
being able to incorporate them into the single
dimension of competition. The level of actual
competition in any given setting is a point moving in 
a four dimensional space where no equilibrium can be 
found as the maximisation of one dimension comes at 
the expense of the others. It is necessary to abandon 
the analysis of an optimised system and to concentrate 
on the study of which alternative decisions are 
available and valid in practice. If all possible 
maximisation present weakness, unintended or 
contradictory results, then all reference to full 
information, to vote maximisiation, to perfect 
vulnerability etc., are irrelevant from the operative 
point of view. It is better to concentrate on 




























































































a different mix of each dimension can be evaluated 
only via choices motivated in each historical 
circumstance by the most needed values sought. We end 
up where we started: what form of competition and how 
much competition bring us back to the definition of 
the 'social value' that needs to be maximised in any 
given case.
Competition is not a defining characteristic of 
democracy but a property of which there can be more or 
less. However, it is not a uni-dimensional phenomenon 
which can be studied 'under optimal conditions'. If 
competition has to perform producing valuable (to 
third part) unintended effects of political 
interaction, it must remain within relatively narrow 
boundaries. Those conditions which in an optimal model 
perspective limit and contain competition, at the same 
time sustain it and make it viable. The set of 
normative factors, of social bonds, and of legal and 
institutional provisions 66 which shape group 
loyalties and identifications, which determine a 
certain amount of collusive practices and which 




























































































limiting both its scope and means, do not represent 
elements of 'imperfection', but conditions of 
viability. Obviously the factors which contain 
competition can be so powerful, encompassing and tight 
that the restraint on competition can suppress it 
altogether. At the same time, these confining 
conditions can be so weak that they do not have the 
capacity to contain competition, whose effects in 
different domains of political life can be detrimental 
to the same beneficial effects competition is thought 
to produce. Political competition needs constraining- 
sustaining conditions as it is unlikely to be 
effective in a world of rational, maximising, selfish 
























































































































































































1 G. Simmel, Conflict and The Web o f Group Affiliation, New York, The Free Press, 1955 (or. ed. 
1908 and 1922), in particular pp. 58-85.
2 Ibid., p. 58. If the prize is firmly in the hand of one adversary, and it needs be directly subtracted to 
him, then other less institutionalised forms of conflict prevail.
’ Ibid., pp. 59-60
* This conception leads Simmel to criticise the socialist ideology of his time. The recognition of the 
purely technical character of these techniques (competition, socialism, gild) should force socialist 
Ideologies and organisations to relinquish their claim to being a self-justifying aim and an ultimate 
value. They should rather argue calculating and appraising themselves in comparison with 
individualistic competition, in so far as it too is a mean to super-individual ends attainment. Ibid., p. 
74.
’ Although differences exist in the definition of this power: votes, offices, influence on policy.
‘ J. A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1954 
(4th ed.) ; A. Downs, An Economic Theory o f Democracy, New York, Harper & Row, 1957.
’ I borrow this term from A. Etzioni, The Moral Dimension. Toward a New Economics, New York, Free 
Press, 1988, in particular Ch. 12: Encapsulated Competition.
* J. A. Schumpeter, op. cit., p. 269.
* Ibid., p. 271.
Ibid., p. 271.
" A. Downs, op. cit., p. 19, footnote n. 11.
11 B. Barry, Sociologists, Economists and Democracy, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 
1970, p. 99.
11 A. Downs, op. cit., p. 107 and ff.
“ J. A. Schumpeter, op. cit., p. 269 and p. 282 respectively.
11 An exhaustive review may identify different social values regarded as by-products of competition. 
For instance, a number of authors of economic formation define such unintended result as the 
'elimination of unnecessary returns to party leaders and functionaries', where unnecessary returns are 
seemingly defined in terms of spoils. See G. J. Stigler, 'Economic Competition and Political 
Competition', Public Choice, 13 (1972), pp. 91-106. However, the only condition regarded as 
indispensable to avoid unnecessary returns is contestability. So it is not necessary to discuss this 
position, already implicit in the Schumpeterian vision.
“ The most obvious example being equal or universal suffrage.
"  For the discussion of the conditions of democracy see R. Dahl, Poliarchy: Participation and 
Opposition, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1971, p. 3 and ff. Note that he lists among them the 
right to compete for electoral support, but he does not go so far as to include political competition as 
such.





























































































"  C. J. Friedrick, Man and his Government, New York, McGraw Hill, 1963
“  This is the term used and discussed in S. Bartolinl and P. Mair, Identity, Competition and Electoral 
Availability, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990.
“ In a  short discussion of the concept of competition K. Strom has mentioned three 'models' of party 
competition, labelling them 'contestability1, 'conflict of interest' and 'performance sensitivity';
'Interparty Competition in Advanced Democracies', Journal o f Theoretical Politics, 1 (1989), pp. 280- 
281. The definition of his first 'models' roughly corresponds to what I will discuss under the same 
label. The second does not correspond to any of my conditions. The third mixes aspects that I will 
discuss separately under the label of availability and decidability.
°  R. D'Alimonte, 'Democrazia e competizione', Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica, 19 (1989), pp. 301- 
319, in particular p. 301, p. 302 and p. 303.
”  G. J. Stigler, 'Perfect Competition, Historically Contemplated', The Journal o f Political Economy, 65 
(1957), p. 6.
” The concept, although formulated much before, did not begin to receive explicit and systematic 
attention in the main stream of economics until the beginning of the 1870's; G. J. Stigler, 'Perfect 
Competition Historically Contemplated', cit., p. 1.
“ G. J. Stigler, Competition, in International Encyclopedia o f Social Sciences, New York, MacMillan & 
The Free Press, 1968, voi. 3, pp. 181-82.
”  J. K. Clark, Toward a Concept of Workable Competition', American Economic Review, 30 (1940), 
pp. 241-256.
27 Ideology is introduced in a second stage, to reduce the implicit huge information costs.
“  By 'sensitivity' Is normally meant 'issue sensitivity'. Against this term three basic criticism were 
advanced:
a) according to the findings of the early American public opinion studies, issue voting is not separated 
from party voting. See A. Campbell, P. E. Converse, W . E. Miller and D. E. Stokes, The American 
Voter: An Abridgement, New York, Wiley, 1964, p. 78;
b) the term issue-sensitive is not correct because anyway there are inconsistencies in the 
presentation of issues (i.e. it is not easy to know where parties-candidates stand on each issues; very 
often ambiguous and confused stances). So an issue-sensitive voter could not make-up his mind. 
See D. Robertson, A Theory o f Party Competition, London, Wiley, 1976, p. 13 for a  list of such 
Inconsistencies in party messages and stances;
c) issue voting in inherently multi-dimensional and cannot be reduced to a  uni-dimensional space. So 
spatial models work poorly with respect to issues and issue-voting . See G. Sartori, Parties and Party 
Systems. A  Framework for Analysis, Cambridge (Mass.), Cambridge University Press, 1976, pp. 330- 
333, who prefers to speak of party images as condensed issue-packages.
In the context of this argument, my definition of the available voter does not make reference to the 
origins of this availability, to how the available voter makes up his mind, and to whether his/her 
position can be represented in spatial terms.
”  On these measures see S. Bartolini, 'La volatilità elettorale', Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica, 16 
(1986), pp. 363-400; and S. Bartolini and P. Mair, op. cit., pp. 20-37.
”  For a  review of individual level volatility studies based on the transition matrices technique see D. 
Denver, Conclusion, in I. Crewe and D. Denver (ed.), Electoral Change in Western Democracies: A 
Framework for Analysis, London, Croom Helm, 1985 , pp. 400-412.
” C. van der Ei)k and E. V. Oppenhuis, 'European Parties' Performance in Electoral Competition', 




























































































"A . Downs, op. cit., pp. 38-40.
”  'A Theory of the Calculus of Voting', American Political Science Review, 62 (1968), pp. 25-43 and 
An Introduction to Positive Political Theory, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall, 1973. They formalise this 
calculus in the following equation:
R = P B -C ,  
where
R *  the expected net utility of voting less the utility of abstaining;
P = the probability of affecting the outcome;
B = the differential benefits over outcomes (the party differential); 
C = the cost of voting.
“ M. Laver and W . B. Hunt, Policy and Party Competition, London, Routledge, 1992, p. 3 . 1 will make 
reference to this work that discusses and summarise the position of rational choice theory on the 
issue.
How this postulate Is essentli to formal modelling is stated several time In the book. A number of 
critical notes concerning the postulate of exogenous preferences are in P. Dunleavy and H. Ward, 
'Exogenous Voter Preference: and Parties with State Power: Some Internal Problems of Economic 
Theories of Party Competition , British Journal o f Political Science, 11 (1981), pp. 352-363. Also 
relevant for the debate about preference shaping or preference adapting competition Is P. Dunleavy, 
Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice, New York, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991,112-144.
” Laver and Hunt
make the hypothesis that the structure of preference in the electorate could be shaped by party 
competition Itself. But this Is a  rather scholastic and rapidly discarded hypothesis :
'If the aims of the theorist are relatively modest, relating to patterns observed at a particular election 
or to a  short sequence of elections, then the structure of electoral preference may be taken as given1 
(Ibid., p. 10). They add that this assumption 'may seem on the face of it to be a  relatively non 
controversial approach to take, though It seems so mainly because such matters have largely been 
ignored by both pure theorists and empirical researchers' (ibid., p. 11). Therefore, the choice is a 
matter of faith' and they 'make no bones about putting our faith in the assumption that tastes are 
exogenous to party competition' (Ibid., p. 3).
"  It can be conceived as an heuristic simplification. If the current structure of electoral preferences 
was shaped by past party activities, there are good reasons to believe that the future structures will oe 
determined by current party activities. Even in presence of a stable short term structure, one can 
work for the bringing about of a different one. A party may find itself cut off from chances of victory 
given the existing structure of preferences of the electorate, but it is not necessarily compelled to 
adapt Itself to this structure. Given that what It does may determine future changes in the voters' 
preferences, party competition is not only an adaptive effort.
"  Downs too assumes preferences of voters as being intrinsic, that is shaped by some force which Is 
both prior and independent from party competition. However in a  small passage he states: though 
parties will move ideologically to adjust to the distribution, under some circumstances, they will also 
attempt to move voters toward their own location, then altering it' [the distribution], op. cit., p. 140. 
This remark is not developed in the work because it implied a  revision of the whole model, entirely 
anchored on the solid rock of the distribution of voters' preferences. Downs' successors have more 




























































































“ See the notes by Simmel, op. cit., pp. 74-76, who discusses the cases of corporations.
”  Two 'pure' example of the consequences in different arenas of party choices about the decidability 
of the electoral offer are represented by the Dutch Socialists strategy in the 1977 elections and the 
Italian Lega In the 1994 elections. The first made their positions far more decidable, opting for an 
adversarial strategy, with the result of winning the electorate but loosing the government. The second, 
in blurring their profile In a  large alliance may have won the government but lost the electorate.
40 A clear presentation of the linkages between the different arenas of the party system is In M. 
Laver, 'Party Competition and Party System Change. The Interaction of Coalition Bargaining and 
Electoral Competition’, Journal o f Theoretical Politics, 1 (1989), 301-324, esp. pp. 302-305.
41 D. E Stokes, Spatial Models o f Party Competition, in A. Campbell et at. Elections and the Political 
Order, New York, John Wiley, 1966, pp. 61-179, In particular pp. 170-173. Valence Issue can be 
defined as non-dimensional issues, that is issues which can not help to order preferences In spatial 
terms.
41 Budge and Farlie present an alternative view of issues. The classic argument of having parties 
located at, say, 30% versus 60% welfare spending assumes that both parties take stands on the 
'same' Issue.
They have argued that parties may try to compete by manipulating the salience of different Issue 
dimensions. That Is, giving prominence and emphasis to those issues on which they are strong and 
which are more favourable to them and, at the same time, downplaying those on which they feel 
weaker.
if parties do so, It may result that instead of talking about the same problems, they talk about 
different problems and what decides the election is the preference of electors for a type of issues 
'owned' by a  type of party. See I. Budge and D. Farlie, Explaining and Predicting Elections: issues, 
Effects and Party Strategies in Twenty-three Democracies, London, Allen & Unwtn, 1983, pp. 152- 
155.
43 W.
Schneider, Styles o f Competition, in R. Rose (ed.), Electoral Participation, A Comparative Analysis, 
London, Sage, 1980, pp. 91-97. The centrality of 'divisiveness' was underlined also In an earlier 
paper: 'Issues, Voting, and Cleavages: A Methodology and Some Tests', American Behavioral 
Scientist, 18 (1974), pp. 111-146.
44 W.
Schneider, Styles o f Competition, cit., p. 93.
"Ib id ., p. 82.
44 The extreme case of the devolution of political issues to forces controlling resources for 
Implementation Is when they are left to the market forces.
47 An Interesting open question Is whether these negotiated order Impose themselves in situation of 
ineffective politico-electoral competition or do they determine the enfeeblement of such competition. 
When existing, such orders reduce the scope of electoral policy competition as policy is decided 
elsewhere. At the same time, they also require as a prerequisite such reduction of the scope of 
electoral competition. Actually the dynamics of electoral competition should normally represent a 
mechanism of instability for such negotiated orders. Actors aiming at the electoral conquest of office 
could challenge such orders, reserving for themselves the right to accept or refuse them in view of 
their electoral goals.
41 Attention to this point, with particular reference to the developemnt in party organisation, is given in 
R. Katz and P. M a lr ,' 'Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence 




























































































"  The Institutionalised political collusion of the Austrian post W .W .II coalitions shows as far as one 
can go in this direction. The great coalitions of socialists and Christian democrats operated on the 
basis of 'pacts' ratified by the two partners after each re-negotiation of the coalition.
The 1949 and 1953 pacts were kept secret; the 1956, 1959 and 1963 pacts were made public. 
'According to each of these pacts, decisions arrived at in the coalition committee (consisting of the 
top leaders of the two partners) are enacted by the unanimous vote of the parliamentary delegations 
of both partners. A complex clause of the pact of 1963 allowing some exception to this unanimity rule 
soon became the subject of controversy between the partners...'.
Coalition pacts and coalition committees (called 'working committee' since 1963), as well as the 
provision for mandatory pariiamentary support for bill agreed upon in the coalition committee were, of 
course, a-constitutional practices.
The loosening of the terms of the coalition achieved in the 1963 pact worked in this way: if no 
agreement was achieved on a specific policy in the coalition committee, each partner may introduce 
a motion regarding it 3 months after the date of disagreement. Parliament had to vote 5 months later. 
The party which loose may demand a  referendum. See F. C. Engelmann, Austria: The Pooling of 
Opposition, in R. A. Dahl (ed.), Political Opposition in Western Democracies, New Haven, Yale  
University Press, 1966, p. 265 and p. 281.
”  It is addressed in G. J. Stigler, 'Economic Competition and Political Competition', Public Choice, 13 
(1972), pp. 91-106, esp. p. 98
. He concludes that this difference is not so important as to challenge the analogy between political 
and economic competition. His point is that competition for authority is not a zero sum game; even 
loosing parties have some form of influence on public policy and the percentage of votes/seats can 
be taken as an indicator of the general influence on the public policy of each party (together with 
other variables like federal government etc. that admit influence of opposition parties). Stigler 
basically denies the governmental executive threshold which offers to the winner the position of 
monopoly provider of public policy. It makes it a question of degree of Influence.
“ D. E. Elkins, 'The Measurement of Party Competition', American Political Science Review, 68 
(1974), p, 686 uses this term.
I!J. A. Schlesinger ,A Tw o Dimensional Scheme for Classifying the States according to the Degree of 
Inter-party Competition', American Political Science Review, 49 (1955), 1120-1128, in particular p. 
1122. The competitive party system then becomes that one where parties present a  similar number 
of electoral victories and a high alternation over a given period of time. Equal number of victories but 
low alternation rate make for cyclically competitive party systems. The remaining are one-party non 
competitive party system which can be distinguished between one-party competitive and one-party 
cyclical.
”  The line chosen by A. Ranney Parties in State Politics, in H. Jacob and K. Vines (eds), Politics in 
American States, Boston, Little, Brown, 1965, pp. 62-71.
“  R. E. Dowson and J. A. Robinson, 'Inter-party Competition, Economic Variables and Welfare 
Policies', Journal o f Politics, 25 (1963), pp. 265-289, stress this dimension of 'opportunity' rather than 
actual result. Also D. E. Elkins, 'The Measurement of Party Competition', cit., insists on opportunity 
and possibility rather than actual records. His definition of competition (in the sense of vulnerability) is 
the probability that the outcome could have been otherwise given the existing distribution of loyalties. 





























































































11 For a  general review to the middle of the 1960's see D. G. Pfeiffer, 'The Measure of Inter-party 
Competition and Systemic Stability', American Political Science Review, 61 (1967), pp. 457-467, 
There are also bad example: one is
N. D. Milder, 'Definitions and Measures of the Degree of Macro-Level Party Competition in Multiparty 
Systems', Comparative Political Studies, 6 (1974), pp. 431-456; who proposes Rae's index of 
fractionalisation, L. Mayer's index fAn Analysis of Measures of Crosscutting and Fragmentation', 
Comparative Politics, 4 (1972), pp. 405-417]; and its own
measure which is a  derivation of the other two. All these indices measure the distribution of forces 
and the number of parties at the same time, and they fail to distinguish among different 
configurations of party systems in terms of vulnerability. Measures of vulnerability have been used in 
American literature as explanatory variable of a variety of factors as Inter-state variation in legislative 
performance, public policy, spending, etc. The explication of variation in turnout has probably been 
the most Investigated fields. Vulnerability in this case becomes important because it maximise the U 
factor in the calculus of voting (see before): the expectation of the voter to be decisive for the 
outcome. Results have been controversial: see Kelley S., Ayres R., Bowen W. G., 'Registration and 
Voting: Putting First Things First1, American Political Science Review, 61, 1967, pp. 359-379;
Kim J. 0 ., Petrocik J. R., Enokson S. N., Voter Turnout among the American States', American 
Political Science Review, 69, 1975, pp. 107-123;
Aldrich J. H., 'Some Problems in Testing Two Rational Models of Participation', American Journal of 
Political Science, 20. 1976, pp. 713-734
; G. Bingham Powell Jr, Voting Turnout in Thirty Democracies: Partisan, Legal, and Socio-Economic 
Influences, in R. Rose (ed.), Electoral Participation. A Comparative Analysis, London, Sage, 1980, pp. 
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Table 1 : The structure of voter preferences
structure of electoral 
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